The mission statement is changing in the process

There are quite a few books about the CIA, chronicling the agency’s early days at the end of World War II and the most significant episodes of the Cold War—featuring moments of heroism and brilliance, as well as the darker aspects of coups d’état and support for dictatorships. Tim Weiner himself, a journalist for The New York Times, published one nearly two decades ago. That research his work as a reporter—for which he won a award —brought him into contact numerous CIA agents and executives and opened the door for him to extend his investigation into the 21st century. mission statementchronicles the activities of the U.S. foreign intelligence service over the past 25 years, from 9/11 in 2001—which marked a B the agency’s role—to Donald Trump’s return to the White House. Considering that this is not a very long period and that the book spans six hundred pages (albeit in a generous font size), it is clear that the author goes into great detail in his narrative; however, this does not make for a tedious read thanks to Weiner’s journalistic style (which is sometimes excessive: some transcribed conversations have a very “colloquial” tone).

The attacks launched by Osama bin Laden against the United States in 2001 led to a change in the mission statement , which shifted to direct, front-line involvement in the war on terrorism: first came the fighting in Afghanistan when the U.S. Army had not yet been deployed (there, in Tora Bora, the Al-Qaeda leader narrowly slipped through their fingers), and then the growing use of armed drones to eliminate suspected Islamist fighters. These increasingly military functions reached their most symbolic culmination with the 2011 appointment director General Petraeus as director , who, as commander of international forces in Afghanistan, had just “triumphed” there following a troop surge and a shift to counterinsurgency tactics.

From that first decade, however, the most striking aspect—and the one to which Weiner returns time and again—is the use of “enhanced” interrogation techniques, employed during the George W. Bush administration and which the Obama administration agreed to classify as “torture” (particularly the internship waterboarding). The author lays out the arguments in favor of these extraordinary measures made by those who defended them (the urgency to obtain information that would thwart further attacks like the one on the Twin Towers, something that was then perceived as a very real risk, and the alleged usefulness of some confessions extracted in this manner)—only to immediately refute them: he denies that the secret prisons opened by the CIA yielded data allowed for the thwarting of new terrorist plans, as was already made clear in the reports produced by Congress.

Beyond this criticism, which is supported by historical evidence, the book seems to be driven by a particular antipathy toward senior officials of the Bush era—it delves excessively into their motives, which Weiner generally views as perverse—and by a gentle condescension toward Obama and his inner circle, whose laudable intentions are taken for granted. This is a black-and-white approach that the author later moves beyond, in relation to the CIA, when addressing Biden’s tenure and Trump’s first presidency.

Although the book does not manage to escape the deep political polarization currently plaguing American society, research is highly credible and accurately reflects the challenges faced by U.S. intelligence over the past quarter-century, as well as the responses provided by both the White House and Langley—the CIA headquarters located on the outskirts of Washington, D.C.

Much of what is recounted mission statement*The mission statementhas already been covered in newspaper articles and other accounts over the years; however, Weiner consolidates many of those accounts with new data statements from numerous key figures. One aspect that is perhaps qualitatively new is the finding that even before he took office—and thus before 9/11 transformed his character—George W. Bush’s team had its sights set on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

An interesting section—one that has received little attention in the literature on the CIA because it is a more recent development and less closely tied to its mission statement —is cognitive warfare. Weiner cites accounts that express the conviction that the Kremlin, through its social media influence campaign, “swayed” certain votes in the 2016 election, which may have been decisive in Trump’s first victory.