Spain and Weapons of Mass Destruction: For the First Time, a Strategy of Its Own

For the first time in its history, Spain has an official position—documented and approved at the highest level—on one of the most sensitive issues in global security: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The National committee approved the National Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction on December 16, 2025, which was subsequently published in the Official State Gazette on February 16, 2026. This is neither a symbolic gesture nor a declaration of intent: it is a top-level political-strategic document that defines threats, sets objectives, and outlines concrete courses of action. The fact that it has taken decades to materialize speaks volumes both about the complexity of the issue and the institutional maturity required to address it.

I. What the National Strategy Against the Proliferation of WMD Is and Is Not

To understand the scope of the Strategy, one must begin with what the text itself identifies as its two main pillars: nonproliferation and counterproliferation. The first focuses on work and multilateral work —that is, strengthening international treaties, actively participating in global forums, and advocating for the nonproliferation regime to withstand current geopolitical tensions. The second looks inward: what is Spain doing to ensure that no non-state actor—whether terrorist, criminal, or simply reckless—can obtain on its territory the materials, knowledge funding necessary to manufacture such subject .

What it is not—and this should be made clear—is an offensive strategy; nor is it a declaration of Spain’s own military capabilities in this area. Spain does not possess nuclear weapons, is not developing biological or chemical weapons, and its position is unequivocally that of a state committed to multilateralism and disarmament. The National committee reiterates this in various ways throughout its pages: the novelty lies not in the Strategy itself, but in the fact that it provides a framework that articulates it, makes it operational, and connects it to the rest of the national security system.

II. When it is published, and why it matters

The context in which this National Strategy is being unveiled is hardly reassuring. The international nonproliferation architecture has been showing cracks for years, but recent developments in international geopolitics have turned those cracks into visible fractures. Russia has not only invaded Ukraine but has also withdrawn from the New START Treaty— agreement not even U.S. President Donald Trump wanted to renew. Putin has also withdrawn Russia’s ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and has single-handedly, or with very few allies, blocked multiple review conferences for international agreements, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). He has not done so out of carelessness, but with the political intent of destabilizing a system that limited his options.

China, for its part, has not hesitated to secretly expand and modernize its nuclear arsenal. Added to this is the status North Korea, which has accelerated its nuclear and ballistic missile program with multiple recent missile tests, including intercontinental ballistic missiles and new types of missile launchers capable of firing nuclear warheads, in clear violation of United Nations (UN) committee resolutions. In the case of Iran, attacks on its nuclear facilities by the United States and Israel stand out, creating a scenario of great uncertainty regarding the future of the program and Tehran’s willingness to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Meanwhile, the political transition in Syria that began in 2025 opens a historic window of opportunity to advance the elimination of its chemical capabilities, although many questions remain.

Spain cannot be a mere observer, since, as a member of NATO, the European Union, and the UN, it has both a voice and responsibilities within these forums. Having its own strategy is the minimum requirement for fulfilling those responsibilities in a coherent manner.

III. The Nuclear: When Energy and the Bomb Share the Same Physics

The nuclear chapter is, to a certain extent, the most complex part of the entire Strategy, and not only because of the nature of the weapons in question, but for a reason that is somewhat paradoxical: nuclear technology is, to a large extent, dual-use, and can be applied to both civilian and military purposes. The uranium that powers a reactor in a power plant and the uranium needed to develop a nuclear bomb are the same material; the difference lies in the Degree enrichment and the engineering involved. This makes any country with civilian nuclear capabilities a country with potential military nuclear ambitions, and requires precise and comprehensive control systems.

Spain is no stranger to this reality: it has seven nuclear reactors in operation, a nuclear fuel plant in Juzbado (Salamanca), a radioactive waste storage facility in El Cabril (Córdoba), and the Center for Energy, Environmental, and Technological Research (CIEMAT), all of which operate under a system of international safeguards that includes IAEA oversight and the implementation of the so-called protocol . Added to this are more than 1,250 radioactive facilities distributed throughout the country, two of which are classified as Category 1, meaning they pose the highest risk. These are research legitimate medical, industrial, and research facilities, but from a proliferation standpoint, they are sites that require special protection.

The Spanish position devotes significant attention to the state of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the so-called “cornerstone” of the international regime, which has 189 member states and has for decades served as the main bulwark against the spread of nuclear weapons. The problem is that, currently, that barrier has significant cracks, as the last two review conferences —in 2015 and 2022—failed to reach agreement, and there is little hope for the one coming up in 2026 either. Some voices propose the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPAN) as an alternative to the NPT; however, as the Spanish Strategy points out, no nuclear-weapon state has signed the TPAN, which, moreover, lacks a clear protocol —in other words, it is an instrument with good intentions but limited practicality.

The dual-use nature of nuclear energy also has an energy dimension that, in the current context, cannot be ignored. The discussion the future of nuclear power plants in Spain—which the Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan calls for closing between 2025 and 2035—is closely linked to the National Strategy. While nuclear power plants are operational, they generate spent fuel that requires safe storage, produce average waste average leave that must be managed for decades, and maintain infrastructure within the country that demands robust physical protection against sabotage or theft of material. The Strategy does not address the discussion , as that falls outside its scope, but it does clearly establish that the physical protection of these facilities, including cybersecurity, is a priority. For this reason, it considers it necessary to review protection plans and update so-called design Basis Threat, which serves as reference letter the design each plant’s security systems.

Another area addressed by the National Strategy that deserves special attention is aerospace technology. An increasing number of countries are developing—or are interested in developing—capabilities to launch satellites. This technology, which is also dual-use in nature, can contribute to development an intercontinental ballistic missile if used for military rather than civilian purposes. Similarly, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are also part of the problem, as they are manufactured using commercial components that are difficult to control. Furthermore, given their low cost, they are easily accessible to non-state actors and can serve as delivery systems for chemical, biological, or even radiological agents. This is one of the areas where international export control regimes lag furthest behind technological reality, and the strategy acknowledges this without reservation.

IV. Dual-use: The Threat Coexisting with the Chemistry Industry Chemistry Biological Laboratories

One of the most interesting aspects of the National Strategy is its reference letter dual-use materials and technologies beyond the nuclear sphere. Setting aside Hollywood movies, the development weapons of mass destruction—especially biological and chemical weapons—does not necessarily require secret facilities or Materials . Many of the substances used in Chemistry industry, research laboratories, or water treatment plants are also, in varying proportions and configurations, precursors or components of chemical or biological weapons.

Spain, as one of the strongest industrial economies in Southern Europe, has a leading chemical export sector: 131 facilities are subject to mandatory reporting due to their activities involving controlled substances, and 53 commercial operators carry out international transfers of substances listed by the CAQ. This does not make the chemical sector a threat in and of itself, but it does require a strengthening of control and oversight mechanisms. The challenge the National Strategy is that many of these operators are simply unaware that they are working with dual-use materials; far from any ill will, there is a lack of awareness, result of which result equally dangerous.

In the biological sphere, the complexity is even greater. Spain has 89 biosafety level 3 laboratories—that is, facilities that work with agents capable of causing serious or potentially lethal diseases. These include laboratories for research , public health, and veterinary medicine. However, in a scenario of proliferation, these are facilities that a malicious actor would seek to compromise. The fact that Spain does not yet have any laboratory 4 laboratory —the highest security laboratory —and that at least three are planned, only underscores the urgency of establishing a framework and security framework that is up to the task.

The concept of dual-use is also increasingly extending to the technological sphere. Artificial intelligence, quantum computing, advanced semiconductors, and synthetic Genetics beneficial and legitimate civilian applications, but they also have the potential to facilitate the design, synthesis, or deployment of a biological weapon. Existing export control regimes are not updating their lists fast enough to keep pace with the rapid advancement of such technologies, creating a gap that the Strategy openly acknowledges as a structural vulnerability of the international system.

V. The Terrorist Threat: leave , Catastrophic Consequences

The National Strategy takes a relatively unalarmist view of the threat posed by terrorist groups in this area. In Spain, risk maps indicate that this possibility carries a considerable level of impact but a leave probability. The use of nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical agents by a group requires the convergence of several factors: intent, technical capability, access to materials, and an opportunity for dispersal; therefore, while it is not impossible, it does not appear to be the most likely scenario.

According to the Strategy, the most realistic risk is not a nuclear attack or a deliberate biological epidemic, but rather the use of toxic industrial chemicals found on the market, in tanker trucks, or in accessible fixed facilities. Also included are so-called radiological dispersal devices, which require only a source and a conventional explosive. These are leave threats, but they generate significant public alarm; causing panic is, in fact, one of the primary objectives of those willing to use them. The IAEA recorded 168 incidents involving nuclear or radioactive material in 2023 alone, six of which were related to trafficking or malicious use. While this figure may not seem particularly high at first glance, it is hardly reassuring.

The Strategy also addresses, with B , the threat of agroterrorism, as the possibility of a biological attack directed not against people, but against livestock or agricultural production, has potentially devastating economic and social consequences. Spain, with its highly significant agri-food sector, is not immune to this risk. Avian influenza and African swine fever are on the list of scenarios to consider, especially given the recent cases of swine fever in wild boars in Catalonia.

VI. Spain’s Commitments: Between Multilateralism and Domestic Coordination

The action-oriented component of the National Strategy is structured around two objectives. The first is to promote Spain’s interests on the international stage: participating more actively in treaty review cycles, assuming presidencies in core topic forums, providing financial support to organizations such as the IAEA or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the guarantor of the CWC, and working with development countries development help them build their own control systems.

The second goal internal: to improve coordination among ministries, strengthen the committee Non-Proliferation committee , tighten controls on the export of intangible technology, and create new bodies such as the National Biosecurity Commission or a network Chemical Alert Laboratories.Among the most concrete measures are the amendment of the Anti-Money Laundering Act to include terrorist financing as a specific offense and the revision of the Smuggling Act, with possible increases in penalties. These are legislative changes that have been on the table for some time and which, now with the momentum of the National Strategy, are more likely to materialize.

VII. A Necessary Strategy, with the challenge Implementation Ahead

The very existence of this Strategy is cause for celebration, as Spain—though B —is firmly joining the group countries that have decided to formulate a coherent policy in one of the most complex areas of national and international security. The international regime for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has faced—and continues to face—significant recent challenges: the use of chemical weapons in the war in Syria, resurgent nuclear threats, doubts about the origins of COVID-19, and rapid development and technological development . That is why the adoption of this Strategy is both timely and necessary.

The challenge Spain is to implement the National Strategy in a coherent and effective manner so that it does not remain a dead letter. The good intentions behind countries’ national security policies are well known; however, they easily gather dust on the shelf when it comes time to allocate budgets, create units, hire experts, and coordinate ministries that have other priorities. Spain already has the necessary conceptual framework; what will also be needed is the political will and institutional capacity to turn it into operational reality. And in a relentless geopolitical context, that cannot wait.