In the picture
Maduro at the time of his transfer to the United States, upon his arrival on U.S. soil, and during his first court appearance
PDF version / SRA 2026 Regional Security report [full PDF]
√ An analysis of the rule the release of political prisoners leads to the conclusion that it has been nothing more than a discretionary tool of management .
√ The government has declared the process of releasing political prisoners complete, but Foro Penal reports that as of late April, 454 remained in prison.
√ The repressive machinery persists in the country: much of the legal and institutional framework of model remains unchanged.
Following Operation “Absolute Resolution” on January 3, in which U.S. troops, having neutralized Venezuelan defenses, apprehended Nicolás Maduro and his wife to stand trial in New York, Delcy Rodríguez—who at the time served as the country’s vice president—took the reins of power. Lacking electoral legitimacy and ultimately written request by the Trump Administration, the new government committed to a transition process toward social peace, democratic coexistence, and national reconciliation, leaving behind the authoritarian years of Chavismo/Madurismo.
However, questions have since been raised as to whether a genuine process of change has truly begun, or whether, on the contrary, we are merely witnessing a sham transition under the same regime, albeit led by a different figurehead. One of the most notable political changes was the enactment of an amnesty law, which in many contexts serves as core topic resolving conflicts and fostering a peaceful transition.
Thus, examining the nature and implementation of the Amnesty Law for Democratic Coexistence, passed by the National Assembly on February 19, 2026, could offer some indication of the desire for genuine change and the new vision of reconciliation being led by Delcy Rodríguez’s interim government. On April 23, Rodríguez declared the process initiated by the law concluded and announced the transition to a new phase: criminal justice reform. She stated that, of the approximately 12,000 applications received, 8,616 people had benefited from the law, regaining their full freedom. However, civil society organizations question both the extent of the freedom regained—in the case of many released prisoners—and the figures themselves. Foro Penal, one of these organizations, estimated that as of late April, 454 political prisoners remained in detention.
The Amnesty Act
Although the Amnesty Law has certainly led to the release of numerous political prisoners who were unjustly imprisoned, it is worth noting certain aspects of the rules and regulations suggest it has been nothing more than a discretionary tool of management .
The following is an analysis of the key aspects of the law, based on reviews conducted by various specialized Venezuelan organizations—such as Foro Penal, Justicia meeting Perdón (JEP)—as well as international bodies, primarily the UN mission statement (hereinafter, mission statement) and Human Rights Watch.
POSITIVE ASPECTS
• article provides that this is a matter of public policy.
• article establishes the principle of favorability.
• article allows individuals abroad to apply for through a lawyer and stipulates that they will not be detained upon entering the country.
• Establish procedures with deadlines and resources.
• It benefits a group , albeit limited, group of prisoners and political dissidents.
• It has led to the release of numerous political prisoners.
NEGATIVE ASPECTS
The law was passed on an expedited schedule, which prevented a transparent and consultative process.
• The scope of the law is narrow, applying only to criminal offenses (not civil, disciplinary, administrative, or other offenses) and a limited list of events.
o Formally, it spans from 1999 to 2026, but the internship covers periods totaling approximately 20 months out of nearly 28 years of persecution.
o It excludes offenses commonly used in politically motivated charges that are often arbitrary in nature, as their definition is open to discretionary interpretation. An example of this is article , which excludes individuals who may be implicated for acts of armed violence or force against the Republic.
• For those who are outside the country, the law does not guarantee that amnesty will be granted before the staff hearing; if it is denied, the person remains subject to the pending criminal proceedings, which poses a real risk.
• Its implementation is left to the very same bodies that carried out the persecution.
• It is unclear whether the amnesty law could be extended to government officials, which would turn it into a mechanism for impunity.
• The law does not recognize the state’s liability for human rights violations, nor does it acknowledge the innocence of the individuals involved or the arbitrary nature of the proceedings.
• Nor are victims of repression accredited specialization , and they are denied the right to effective redress.
• It does not provide for transparent and comprehensive processes, independent investigations, or truth-seeking mechanisms.
In addition to the shortcomings inherent in the literal wording of the law, its implementation has revealed a number of other problems. First, many applicants for amnesty have encountered certain obstacles in the processing of their amnesty requests, such as the courts’ rejection of petitions either due to alleged procedural errors, lack of skill, or because they were filed by the defense (despite the law’s public policy nature). These systematic denials thus constitute unjustified exclusions of civilians and military personnel who clearly meet the established criteria. Furthermore, some organizations, such as Foro Penal, report that certain courts have refused to submit of the denial rulings, thereby preventing individuals from appealing their cases.
Second, the authorities claim that a total of 8,616 people have been unconditionally released under the law. However, the government denies application certain organizations on the official list of beneficiaries application . The fact is that there are no official public records of these cases, and therefore these figures cannot be effectively verified. Consequently, estimating the issue people released from prison is difficult, especially since we did not know the initial number of those incarcerated, as there is no data and definitive data on the identity and issue political prisoners. Added to this is the government’s systematic refusal to allow these organizations access to detention centers, severely restricting their work. This secrecy undermines the transparency of the process, which takes place behind closed doors, casting doubt on the veracity of the promised transition.
Third, several organizations, particularly the JEP, have denounced a subversion of the hierarchy rules and regulations in procedural terms: the application of the aforementioned amnesty law subsumes and redefines mandatory rights enshrined in the Organic Code of Criminal Procedure (COPP), transforming a legal obligation into an act of political grace. Indeed, Articles 230 and 231 of the COPP would require the immediate release of more than 300 people, due to the expiration or disproportionate application of coercive measures staff for humanitarian reasons related to critical health conditions (Articles 230 and 231 of the COPP, respectively).
Finally, it is worth noting that hundreds of Venezuelans remain unjustly deprived of their liberty. Among them are people with disabilities and serious health issues, older adults, and some minors. Furthermore, while the releases made possible by this legal instrument are cause for celebration, many of those released remain under research , are subject to measures restricting their freedom (some have been placed under house arrest), or have not had their rights fully restored.
The transitional appearance
Although Nicolás Maduro is no longer in power and there have been some personnel changes in key leadership positions, the repressive apparatus remains intact, hindering the genuine process of change in Venezuela. Repression, institutional mistrust, and judicial opacity persist.
For the reasons outlined above, the Amnesty Law alone has failed to serve as an tool to mark a turning point in the country’s reform process. Not only that, but those granted amnesty remain subject to the same laws and institutions that served as the basis for their imprisonment. Similarly, the announced closure of the Helicoide is insufficient to put an end to serious human rights violations, as local organizations have documented politically motivated detentions at other facilities across the country, as well as evidence of clandestine detention centers operating outside any framework . Both of these “changes” are more like a political or legal mirage, intended to ease global pressure and restore the country’s standing in the international community by projecting an image of transition and reform, when in reality it is nothing more than a strategy for legitimization.
It should also be noted that even after the start of this “new chapter” in Venezuela’s history, the Venezuelan government has continued to be responsible for human rights violations, underscoring that this repressive legal and institutional machinery remains in operation. This is evident not only in the aforementioned detentions that have yet to be lifted, but also in the persistent restriction of civic and democratic space.
An example of this is the 87 arrests made shortly after the interim government took office, either in celebration of Maduro’s capture or because officials refused to fabricate evidence related to the military attack on January 3. Civil society organizations, the few independent media outlets that still exist, and dissident political figures continue to be subjected to attacks, intimidation, persecution, and criminalization. In this regard, it is worth noting the growing tensions between the Venezuelan government and these local and international bodies, which the Minister of the Interior has labeled as “mafia-like” and “extortionists.” Under this speech , the executive branch imposes certain limits and restrictions on their actions, preventing a full research the systematic arbitrary detentions or oversight of the release process, as mentioned earlier. Likewise, fear and mistrust of Venezuelan institutions persist as structural features, reflected in cases where family members refrain from reporting detentions for fear of reprisals, as outlined mission statement the UN mission statement .
The repressive machinery that persists
This situation will persist in Venezuela as long as the legal and institutional framework of model remains unchanged. It is imperative to dismantle the inherited authoritarian machinery, as it is impossible to build a new democratic system on instructions are at odds with it.
Several civil society organizations have denounced the essay and the composition of institutions that continue to pose insurmountable obstacles to the transition and undermine the human rights of the Venezuelan people. Below are the most significant structural features still present in Venezuela’s five branches of government, which, taken together, keep the authoritarian apparatus in place.
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
The authorities' declaration of a state of emergency serves as a pretext for taking intrusive measures and strengthening the apparatus of repression.
Several high-ranking government and military officials responsible for crimes against humanity continue to hold senior positions in the executive branch and the security forces.
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
Various laws that permit human rights violations remain in force:
• The 2024 Law on the Oversight, Regulation, Operations, and Funding of Non-Governmental Organizations, which grants the government broad powers to regulate the operations and funding of nongovernmental organizations and establishes vague and ambiguous grounds for dissolving them. It continues to hinder civil society’s ability to operate safely and freely and must be repealed.
• The 2024 Simón Bolívar Organic Law Against the Imperialist Blockade and in Defense of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, which criminalizes any criticism of the authorities or advocacy for sanctions against Venezuela or its officials. Violators face up to 30 years in prison and disqualification from holding public office.
• The 2017 Constitutional Law Against Hate, for Peaceful Coexistence and Tolerance, which imposes prison terms of 10 to 20 years on anyone who “publicly promotes, encourages, or incites hatred, discrimination, or violence” and has been used to detain critics under broadly defined offenses. It is used to suppress dissent.
• The 2012 Law Against Organized Crime and the Financing of Terrorism, which has been used to prosecute political opponents, protesters, and foreign nationals, among others, for alleged terrorism-related offenses, with sentences ranging from 25 to 30 years.
• The 2004 Law on Social Responsibility in Radio and Television, amended in 2010, which has been used to restrict freedom of expression and freedom of the press, and to censor and shut down media outlets.
JUDICIARY
In 2004, it ceased to be an independent branch of government when President Hugo Chávez passed a judicial reform and co-opted the Supreme Court of Justice.
Since then, the Court has supported the executive branch in its crackdown on critics, with the lack of independence among magistrates, judges, and prosecutors ensuring impunity for crimes committed by officials.
ELECTORAL POWER
Members of committee Electoral committee took a series of measures to prevent candidates from the civil service examination from registering civil service examination the last election.
PEOPLE'S POWER
Lack of transparency and public participation in the appointment of the heads of the Attorney General’s Office and the Office of the Ombudsman.
The assessment committee (responsible for the selection process) is composed solely of sitting legislators, rather than representatives from various sectors of society, as required by the Constitution and the Organic Law on Citizen Power, thereby compromising its independence and impartiality.
The procedure selecting appointees currently lacks transparency as well, because it has proceeded without the publication of regulations, schedule the assessment criteria. This limits the public’s ability to participate in an informed manner, undermining the legitimacy of the process.
Without more profound and lasting change, the public cannot be confident that the years of repression and violence have come to an end. Otherwise, we would be facing nothing more than a sham transition—one that serves the interests of the Venezuelan government but will not uphold the rights of the Venezuelan people.