The ghost fleet: a threat to maritime safety

Also known as the “dark fleet” or “shadow fleet,” the term “ghost fleet” reference letter a network ships that operate outside standard maritime control and monitoring systems with the goal evading international sanctions. In recent years, largely as a result of current conflicts—particularly the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022—and the expansion of international sanctions, this phenomenon has reached a significant scale and importance, posing a threat to international maritime security.  

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) defines the ghost fleet as including those vessels engaged in illegal operations intended to circumvent sanctions, evade compliance with safety or environmental regulations, avoid insurance costs, or engage in other illegal activities. These vessels are typically old and in poor condition and are associated with opaque owners and complex Structures goal conceal the actual beneficiaries. These fleets allow sanctioned states to export oil and other related products subject to international sanctions at prices above the limits set by regulations, thereby generating revenue that would otherwise be restricted. Furthermore, these ships facilitate access to markets that would otherwise be closed to such exporters by presenting the cargo as originating from non-sanctioned countries.

To achieve its goal, the ghost fleet employs various strategies designed to conceal its operations. Among the most commonly used techniques is the deactivation of the Automatic Identification System (AIS), which is responsible for identifying and locating ships in maritime traffic, to make it appear as though they are elsewhere—a tactic known as spoofing. Likewise , these vessels often frequently change their flags to those of jurisdictions with more flexible regulations. On the other hand, regarding the vessel’s identity, certain ships choose not to alter it, instead adopting the status of “zombie ships.” This strategy involves impersonating vessels that have already been decommissioned and sent for scrapping, using the unique registration numbers previously assigned by the International Maritime Organization, similar to the fraudulent use of a deceased person’s identity. It is also common to transfer cargo between vessels on the high seas, a practice known as “ship-to-ship transfer,” whereby oil is transferred to other tankers without legal restrictions and then transported to its final destination, passing it off as coming from a legitimate source.

It is important to distinguish between ghost fleets and gray fleets. The latter exploit legal ambiguities and regulatory loopholes to operate in a legal gray area. Although these vessels typically keep their AIS systems active and appear to comply with current regulations, they manipulate information and engage in practices that fall on the fringes of international law. It is true that these activities are not strictly illegal, but they often exceed the limits of what is legally acceptable, which hinders enforcement efforts.

The problem

The activities of these fleets pose a major challenge to international maritime safety and environmental protection. Because these vessels are aging and poorly maintained, they often lack adequate insurance and are more prone to collisions and accidents, with serious consequences for the environment. In the event of an accident in territorial waters, the affected coastal states face serious difficulties in identifying those responsible and seeking compensation, due to the lack of transparency in the ownership structure. As result, the presence of these vessels poses a threat not only to other ships sharing the same shipping lanes but also to marine ecosystems and coastal communities vulnerable to potential oil spills.

The 2022–2024 period has been marked by an unprecedented expansion of ghost fleet activity, largely as a result of the sanctions imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine, with the goal reducing the Kremlin’s revenue, particularly through its oil sector. According report a report the financial intelligence firm S&P Global, a substantial portion of the tankers transporting Russian crude oil do not have insurance recognized by the twelve mutual companies that make up the group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs, manager approximately 90% of global maritime transport.

This data suggests that approximately 80% of Russian oil is transported by ghost fleets, highlighting these networks’ ability to circumvent Western sanctions. The revenue generated by these illicit activities plays a significant role in sustaining the Economics and financing its military efforts in the face of Western sanctions. Furthermore, it provides Moscow with an argument to reinforce its narrative regarding the ineffectiveness of such sanctions.

International Responses

In response to the expansion of Russian ghost fleets, the European Union and the United States have taken necessary measures to address this phenomenon. The European Union continues to tighten its measures against these vessels by adding new ships to its sanctions regime. With this, the EU aims to limit the revenue contributing to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine and expand a list that now includes 597 vessels. These ships, mostly oil tankers, are barred from entering European ports and are excluded from numerous services related to maritime transport.

At the same time, the navies of various countries have begun to detain and inspect several vessels linked to the ghost fleet. A clear example is the French Navy’s boarding and seizure of an oil tanker off the coast of Almería on January 22, based on intelligence provided by the United Kingdom. The French government justified the boarding based on article of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which allows a warship to inspect another vessel when there are doubts about its nationality or status . Meanwhile, on January 7, the United States intercepted the vessel Marinera in the North Atlantic, between Iceland and Scotland. The ship was coming from the Caribbean Sea and, according to Washington, was violating sanctions related to Venezuelan oil. The Navy also announced that same day the interception on the high seas of the M/T Sophia, a stateless vessel subject to U.S. sanctions.

The project maritime project presented by the European External Action Service proposes the establishment of bilateral agreements between the European Union and those states whose flags are employee allow employee preventive inspections of suspicious vessels. However, the detention and boarding of foreign ships on the high seas remains a sensitive issue under international law. In any case, the increase in traffic places particular pressure on the monitoring and security services of countries located along the main routes, such as Spain. The recent report on National Security, published in May, specifies that over the past year, the transit of the Russian ghost fleet has increased fivefold in waters near the Iberian Peninsula.

Challenges

The phenomenon of ghost fleets significantly undermines the international community’s ability to safeguard maritime security and effectively enforce economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool. The emergence of parallel transport networks highlights the limitations of the current maritime monitoring system and sample sanctioned actors adapt their strategies to maintain their trade.

Consequently, the challenge authorities is not only to identify these vessels but also to establish robust international legal frameworks that will enable them to effectively curb the mobility operation of these vessels, as well as to close the regulatory loopholes that allow them to operate.