China's Policy Toward Latin America: Beijing Holds Its Ground Against Trump

PDF version / SRA 2026 Regional report [full PDF]

√ The release in late 2025 of a new Chinese policy document for the region, just days after the “Trump Corollary” was made official, speaks to skill influence.

√ China is pressuring its trading partners not to side with Taiwan amid the prospect of a conflict over the island, despite the U.S.'s strategic ambiguity.

√ The U.S. crackdown on infrastructure projects managed by Chinese companies has not prompted Beijing to implement any divestment or withdrawal plans.

The United States’ assertiveness in its desire to dominate its geographical surroundings—symbolized by the operation to capture Nicolás Maduro and the authority it has exercised over Venezuela ever since—poses a risk of friction with other powers—Russia, but above all China—that also aspire to exert influence in the region. Although U.S. pressure has led, for example, to the two main ports of the Panama Canal no longer being in Chinese hands over the past year, Beijing has sought to demonstrate that it will not be intimidated and that it stands its ground against Trump.

On December 10, the Chinese government released a new white paper on its relations with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). This is the third white paper Beijing has produced on the region, following those from 2008 and 2016. Beyond its diplomatic tone and extensive content, one of the most significant aspects is its publication date, just days after Washington released its new National Security Strategy, in which the Western Hemisphere occupies a priority position, thus creating a perception of competition between the two powers. Under this new strategy, the United States aims to reaffirm and apply “the Monroe Doctrine to restore U.S. preeminence in the Western Hemisphere” as well as deny “non-hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to possess or control strategically vital assets” in the region.

Although this statement of objectives makes no reference letter to Beijing, it can be inferred that Washington will adopt a firmer stance regarding its geopolitical interests, regardless of the origin of any strategies that may be directed against it. Similarly, the Chinese document makes no mention of U.S. objectives in LAC. However, the short time span between the two documents indicates that both world powers are on alert regarding their rival’s future actions.

framework documents

Latin America has been the subject of three white papers issued by the Chinese government over the past 16 years. The first was published in 2008, at a time when international trade relations were on the rise. It stated that Beijing’s policy objective was to “build and develop a association and cooperative association characterized by equality, mutual benefit, and development .”

The document published in November 2016, for its part, introduced a new strategic vision by incorporating the “1+3+6” framework, based on three pillars (trade, investment, and financial cooperation) and six areas of cooperation (energy, resources, infrastructure, manufacturing, and scientific and technological innovation). Many analysts view this initiative as an ambitious project marks a new shift in Beijing’s approach to its economic and political relations with third countries, as it was consolidated through the China-CELAC Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Priority Areas, which cemented the region’s integration into the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative). It follows that, over time, Beijing has progressively defined its foreign policy, structuring it around various axes—whether diplomatic or economic—which explains the scope achieved in its third white paper.

Following in the footsteps of its predecessors, the latest white paper continues to propose political cooperation as the foundation of relations between China and the region. This third document outlines the “Five Initiatives for Building a China-LAC Community with a Shared Future,” encompassing the initiatives on Solidarity, development, Civilization, Peace, and People-to-People Connectivity.

Similarly, one of the most important and recurring themes in Chinese politics—the One-China principle—is explicitly reflected in this third version. Indeed, within the section dedicated to the Solidarity Program, it is stated that “the One-China principle is the political foundation and fundamental premise for China to develop diplomatic relations with other countries.” This statement highlights an essential condition imposed by Beijing for maintaining diplomatic relations with third countries. According to the document, China is willing to develop political ties with LAC states, provided that it is “on the basis of the One-China principle.”

This stance is particularly noteworthy, as Latin America is home to most of the few countries that still maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Specifically, these relations are limited to seven countries: Belize, Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

The fact that Beijing demands recognition of the One-China principle as a prerequisite for establishing formal relations with other states is of great significance. First, because it exerts significant pressure on those Latin American countries that do not recognize this principle but could benefit from more extensive cooperation with China. Second, because it seeks to expand China’s sphere of influence in the region and, at the same time, counteract the foreign policy pursued by Washington, which, despite nominally recognizing the One-China principle, maintains a policyof strategic ambiguity toward the Republic of China that leaves open the possibility of future U.S. intervention in defense of Taipei.

Overall, it can be said that Beijing aims to maintain a sense of continuity across its three white papers on Latin America and the Caribbean, reflecting a foreign policy vision that has been evolving over decades. Although this approach is approach disruptive in nature, the third white paper presents a position that conflicts with Washington’s, suggesting that the regional political landscape could become embroiled in a prolonged conflict of interests between the two superpowers.

Multilateral cooperation

To understand the evolution of political and trade relations between China and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), it is necessary to analyze their foundations and origins. More specifically, one must begin with the non-interventionist stance that Beijing has always maintained toward Latin American states. Indeed, in the face of continuous military interventions led by Washington (it is estimated that, over the past 250 years, 34% of such military campaigns have targeted LAC countries), many Latin American states have sought to foster regional cooperation that would allow them to act with greater autonomy. Hence the creation of organizations such as UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) or CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States), aimed at resisting the powerful influence of countries like the United States. Given this geopolitical context, China’s stance represented a less interventionist alternative, one more open to a model international cooperation based on exchange mutual benefit. This cooperation is less marked by realist geopolitics and more by a liberal vision of interdependence as the driving force that strengthens bilateral and multilateral relations between states.

From an economic perspective, the People’s Republic of China has established a significant presence in the economies of Latin American countries since the beginning of the century. China has become Latin America’s second-largest partner (and South America’s largest) and a selective investor: while its FDI remains far behind that of the U.S. and the EU, it has focused on energy resources, mining, and agriculture, and has gradually expanded into the infrastructure sector as part of an evolving process.

However, China’s economic impact on the region has raised concerns, both because, while it has boosted Latin American exports, it has also“commoditized”them (reducing these countries to mere exporters of raw materials, without moving toward the export of added value products), and because of the risks of the so-called “debt trap” (a status economic dependence in which the creditor country can dictate the terms to debtor countries, taking control of critical infrastructure, for example).

Between 2013 and 2021, China granted more than $145 billion in loans to Latin American countries, and the academic community is divided on the issue. Some view China as a relatively new creditor on the global geopolitical stage, making it more likely to lend funds inefficiently due to its lack of experience. Other scholars, however, interpret China’s economic policy as a deliberate mechanism for expanding influence.

Regardless of China’s underlying motives for lending such large sums of money, there is no doubt that several countries in the region are heavily indebted to Beijing. In fact, it has been estimated that Latin America has the highest level of debt service payments—nearly 4% of regional GDP—a figure that exceeds that of Africa or Asia. When examining the exact amounts of these individual debts, it becomes clear that relations between China and Latin American countries are marked by a distinct tone of economic subordination. Venezuela is estimated to owe China between $8 billion and $13 billion, and Ecuador, about $2.5 billion.

partnership and cabling partnership

One of the strategic aspects of the Chinese white paper that Washington views with the greatest concern is the partnership that Beijing is proposing to Latin American countries, to which the document devotes an entire section. China encourages its partners to use the BeiDou satellite navigation system and to serve as a base for its satellite communications.

In fact, the congress introduced a bill last February report warning about Chinese radars in South America, which written request operated written request the orders of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. U.S. authorities have also lobbied against a project a direct undersea cable for data transmission data telecommunications between Valparaíso and Hong Kong, which Chile’s new president, José Antonio Kast, halted in March upon taking position.

Washington’s attempt to block China’s economic and technological advancement in the Western Hemisphere is not being met in Beijing with any plans to pull back investments; rather, China is seeking to respond forcefully to moves such as the takeover of the Panama Canal ports or the U.S. effort to undermine the reputation of the major Peruvian port of Chancay.