Noboa and Petro blame each other for the insecurity along the border between the two countries

PDF version / SRA 2026 Regional Security report [full PDF]

√ The Ecuadorian president accuses his counterpart of neglecting border security; the Colombian president responds that the neighboring country’s army has bombed his territory.

√ In response, Noboa has raised tariffs on Colombian products to 100%; Petro has matched those tariffs and has also suspended electricity exports.

√ This is the first time that disagreements over the management cross-border crime have resulted in financial penalties, in violation of the rules of the Andean Community of Nations.

Since Daniel Noboa took office as president of Ecuador, disagreements with his Colombian counterpart, Gustavo Petro, have been constant. The most recent—a long-standing tension over border security and transnational crime—has led to an unprecedented trade dispute between the two countries. Although the relationship between Bogotá and Quito has traditionally been characterized by a focus on cooperation and development , this is not the first time that diary have fractured the relationship. On this occasion, however, the measures taken by both countries threaten not only to destroy decades of trade agreements but also to exacerbate Ecuador’s energy shortage.

The border between the two neighboring countries has been plagued by armed groups over the years; in fact, the two countries experienced periods of military tension during the presidencies of Álvaro Uribe and Rafael Correa, when Colombian troops attacked a FARC camp located on Ecuadorian soil. After that period, relations tended to normalize, but the 2016 Colombian agreement led to FARC dissidents and other groups crossing into the other country more frequently, especially as drug shipments began seeking a route out through Ecuadorian ports. This led to the spread of the drug trafficking problem, with the rise of local criminal groups and the rapid deterioration of public safety in Ecuador.

Rise in violence

So far this decade, Ecuador has gone from being a transit point to becoming a strategic logistics hub for the collection and export of narcotics from Colombia. According data the Armed Conflict data and Event data Project (ACLED), the status Ecuador is likely to worsen this year.

Ecuador currently has the highest homicide rate in Latin America. That rate rose from 7.8 to 45.7 murders per 100,000 inhabitants between 2020 and 2023, a figure that the 2025 United Nations report homicides attributes to violence linked to cocaine trafficking and the presence of gangs in certain regions of the country. In 2024, the rate dropped slightly to 38.8 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, but in 2025 it reached a record high of 50.9. ACLED estimates that 71% of the population has been exposed to the escalation of violence, leading to a significant increase in internal displacement and withdrawal country.

The figures show no sign of improving, even though Noboa has launched a war against organized crime, including with close military cooperation from the United States. The Ecuadorian president accused Petro in late January of “abandoning” the border by withdrawing Colombian troops stationed there. In mid-March, Petro accused Noboa of authorizing a bombing by his army on Colombian soil, following the explosion of a bomb that, as would later be determined, fell accidentally, without causing any injuries. In late April, Noboa struck back, accusing his counterpart of orchestrating an alleged guerrilla incursion into Ecuador. This is a feud, played out primarily on social media, that shows no signs of ending—at least not until Petro leaves office in August.

Economic and energy implications

While this dispute is verbal, its consequences have spilled over into the Economics the energy sector and are directly affecting citizens. In January, Noboa imposed 30% tariffs on imports of Colombian products; he raised the surcharge to 50% in February and then doubled it to 100%. He has praised the fact that this has shifted the trade balance between the two countries from a deficit to a surplus for Ecuador, but that overlooks the impact of higher prices on purchases.

Petro has consistently responded by matching the move, imposing similar restrictions on the import of Ecuadorian goods into Colombia. He has also taken two additional steps: bringing the case before the judicial bodies of the Andean Community (CAN), in the hope that actions contrary to the region’s free market principles will be rejected, and fail electricity fail to the southern neighbor.

Although Bogotá’s decision to fail electricity supply was justified by the need to prioritize domestic supply due to climate variability, the measure has been interpreted internationally as political retaliation. The narrative of “domestic need” is inconsistent with recent history; even during the severe droughts caused by the El Niño phenomenon in 2023 and 2024, Colombia continued to export electricity to Ecuador. For Colombia’s energy sector, this suspension of supply represents a significant economic loss, considering that in 2024, revenue of US$329 million was generated from energy sales to Ecuador.

It is important to note that Ecuador’s electricity system has consistently faced a shortfall in energy production, particularly during droughts, which is why the country has been heavily reliant on power supplies from Colombia to ease pressure on the system and mitigate the risk of blackouts or rationing. Ecuador’s Minister of Environment and Energy argued, days before the tariffs were imposed, that the system was reducing the deficit and moving away from the risk of shortages. Now, without the purchase of energy from Colombia—which accounted fornearly 12% of the country’s demand—it is very likely that Ecuador’s energy difficulties will worsen.

This is the first time that such economic restrictions have been used coercively in the region, and they represent a significant blow to businesses in the border area, particularly agricultural producers and industries that depend on cross-border trade. There is no doubt that security at the border and in both countries requires cooperation and policy alignment in the fight against drugs and transnational crime, but it is not entirely clear or feasible that the measures taken by Quito are proportionate or consistent with the needs.