In the picture
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva at a meeting January 2026
The transformation of the world order is placing enormous strain on the major powers, which are forced to consolidate their positions—whether out of their own ambition or to avoid being overwhelmed by another. In the case of the United States, China, or Russia, their actions are largely driven by offensive strategy; the European Union, on the other hand, finds itself thrust into a rivalry among powers that it neither anticipated nor desired. With its substantive relationship with Washington fractured; at odds with Moscow over the invasion of Ukraine; and wary of Beijing due to the economic and commercial impact of China’s rise, the EU is seeking strategic autonomy that will allow it to guarantee its independence and safeguard its interests on its own.
South America presents itself as a partner for this purpose, to mutual benefit; it is a region that offers the EU the opportunity to develop key capabilities. As part of what has come to be known as the West, the South American subcontinent is, after North America, the closest to Europe in terms of social values. But the rapprochement, facilitated by this relative affinity, is driven above all by the geopolitical imperatives affecting the other major powers.
Outside the gravitational pull of ‘Donroe’ and the Indo-Pacific
Two ongoing tectonic shifts are driving both regions toward a partnership . One is the revitalization of the Monroe Doctrine, this time through the Trump Corollary, which, while encompassing the entire Western Hemisphere, aims to keep the United States’ immediate neighbors on a tight leash while allowing a degree of autonomy for countries further south—provided they do not grant strategic access to a direct rival such as China. The other is the shift of the world’s axis to the Indo-Pacific: with less contention, then, the Atlantic may once again become the European sea it was centuries ago. Some South American countries certainly fall under the influence of these centrifugal dynamics (those on the Caribbean side, drawn northward, and those on the Pacific side, drawn eastward), but their distance from the central power hub grants them greater freedom of decision. The South American countries on the Atlantic side—precisely those that make up Mercosur, with whom the EU has established an ambitious agreement that goes even further (it consists of three pillars: one is trade, the other two concern political dialogue and cooperation)—are the ones that, in any case, are called upon to constitute a critical foothold for European strategic autonomy.
As for the so-called “Dornroe Doctrine,” the Trump administration has defined a priority zone stretching from Greenland to the equator, where it appears to want to address—more or less directly—the major security risks perceived by Washington. South of that line, it encourages countries to primarily shoulder their own security burdens themselves or, if necessary, through alliances (presumably with the U.S. or friendly forces, such as the EU) that ensure China is denied strategic footholds in their territories. This leaves room for a sort of division of spheres of influence and allows the EU, without harming the ultimate security interests of the US, to act according to its own criteria regarding South America, with the exception of the northernmost part (Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana). Spain’s ties with Spanish-speaking American countries, as well as the current or former Caribbean possessions of England, France, and the Netherlands, allow European action to extend beyond the equator, establishing valuable dialogues with all of Latin America, although full autonomy can only be exercised where U.S. priorities wane.
The Indo-Pacific landscape is governed by a looser, less unambiguous organizing principle, with various powers—both major and middle-sized—competing for spheres of influence or preventing their rivals from exercising it: China, India, the United States, Japan, Australia... For this reason, South American Pacific nations such as Peru and Chile, even while benefiting from what has come to be called the Asian century (by extension, one could speak of the Indo-Pacific century), can easily also be oriented toward a European-led Atlantic.
Regardless of whether Europe should also be a player in the Indo-Pacific—although for now the focus is on individual countries with sovereignty in the region (France) or former colonial ties (the Netherlands or England, though not an EU member)—the EU undoubtedly has greater leeway to chart its own course in the Atlantic. This is a form of Atlanticism that is not limited to a transatlantic relationship with the North, but must also look intently to the South: to the South American Atlantic and, progressively, also to that of West Africa (East Africa, via the Indian Ocean, will likely tend to integrate with Asia).
South America is, therefore, a area which the EU—as a power that aspires to play its hand on the world stage, in a game with other global players—can maintain a relationship that aligns with its own strategy. The 440 million people of South America, together with the 450 million in the EU, constitute a formidable social and economic force.
The relationship is set to become closer, as has been stated, with the countries that formed the Southern Common Market in 1991 (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay), which have now been joined by Bolivia. Not only in trade terms, in the context of agreement Mercosur-EU free agreement that entered into force this year and is the largest in the world, but also in matters of technology, investment, and integration. The connection to the broader reality of the EU and its institutional experience can facilitate the removal of the remaining barriers between Mercosur countries (such as Argentina’s understandable reluctance toward a more powerful Brazil, or Uruguay and Paraguay’s toward their two larger neighbors). If this experiment in a form of unification centered on the vast Paraná River basin—the region best suited for this in all of Latin America—were to make further progress, it could attract neighboring countries, such as those currently part of the flagging Pacific Alliance (in this case, Colombia, Peru, and Chile), and facilitate the leap that South American integration still lacks (and which has always been viewed with skepticism despite the usual grand speeches about regional brotherhood).
Energy, technology
South America offers the EU key elements for building its strategic autonomy framework, such as access to energy (oil and gas, but also renewable energy), critical minerals, and an environment conducive to development . The EU is already the second-largest source of foreign direct investment in Latin America, behind the United States and well ahead of China, and part of those investment portfolios is already focused on natural resources and new technologies.
At a time when the EU has decided to phase out Russian hydrocarbons and has reservations about its dependence on both U.S. LNG and the oil and gas that must pass through the Strait of Hormuz, the sustained increase in oil and gas production in South America has become highly sought after. This is true for the Trump administration, which controls Venezuela’s oil production and can indirectly influence that of Guyana, but the distribution of the equally rising production in Brazil and Argentina (even though the latter depends heavily on U.S. investors) is not subject to Washington’s geopolitical objectives. Nor are the strategic minerals from the lithium triangle (Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina), or from the major copper deposits (Chile, Peru), or niobium and rare earths (especially Brazil).
The availability cheap electricity from the massive Itaipú Dam, located on the Paraná River between Paraguay and Brazil, presents an opportunity for powering data centers. Paraguay, which has a significant surplus of its allocated power, has traditionally used this electricity to attract manufacturing investment to its territory (a strategy further bolstered by its extraordinarily low corporate tax rate), and now aims to promote the establishment of AI factories. For the technology sector, the region’s well-trained and relatively inexpensive workforce can be a major draw. Furthermore, the development solar energy in the Atacama Desert and the growth potential of wind farms in many locations point to a scale of green energy that aligns with the goals set by the EU.
The harmonization of production between the EU and Mercosur faces its test the implementation of agreement , the viability agreement which has been vociferously contested by the agricultural sector in several European countries and on which the Court of Justice of the EU has yet to rule. If its entrance force—for the time being on a provisional basis—were to be halted and further obstacles proved insurmountable, Brussels would have missed a vital opportunity to secure a broad framework on which to base a significant part of its strategic autonomy.
Spain Takes Center Stage
The EU must compete closely with other major powers in various regions of the world. One that concerns it very directly is the Arctic, the other region—along with the Indo-Pacific—that is emerging as the scene of future rivalries. There, the EU is a competitor in its own right, particularly due to the strategic value of Greenland, a position that would be greatly strengthened if the current developments in Norway culminated in that entrance to the Union. Faced with these more contentious scenarios, South America offers Europeans the possibility of a less contested strategic alliance, although it must surpass what the U.S. and China can offer there. The prospect of co-leadership with Brussels could entice Brasilia’s involvement, thereby reducing its exhibition aligning with China and Russia within the BRICS.
In the EU’s relations with each region of the world, certain European countries stand out—those most directly affected by specific economic interests or unique historical and cultural ties. As for the Indo-Pacific, France is attempting to subordinate the EU’s position to its own decisions (where China is strictly concerned, German industry stands out); in the Arctic, the voices of Denmark, Sweden, and Finland are, logically, the most active... The commitment to South America matters to many, but notably to Spain (and Portugal), which should aspire to fully embrace this renewed Atlanticism.
* Emili J. Blasco is director GASS; this text was prepared as the basis for a presentation at the 3rd training course on “The Strategic Autonomy of the European Union,” organized by Equipo Europa from May 21 to 23, 2026.