Somaliland, Israel, and the Crisis of Recognition

's recognition of Somaliland as a state on December 26 marked an unprecedented development in international relations in the Horn of Africa: Israel became the first United Nations member to formally recognize Hargeisa's sovereignty since it unilaterally declared its independence in 1991. Israel’s diplomatic move has drawn widespread criticism, particularly regarding the profound implications for the region, the geopolitical motives underlying the recognition, and the inconsistency surrounding the concept of international recognition.

The implications of this recognition cannot be fully understood without examining the historical context of relations between Somaliland and Somalia. In 1880, Somaliland was administered as a British protectorate, while the rest of the territory that is now Somalia was under Italian colonial control. Later, within the framework the decolonization processes of the mid-20th century, Somaliland achieved formal independence on June 26, 1960, and on July 1 of that same year entered into a union with the rest of Somalia, forming a single Somali state.

The union would soon begin to suffer from the clan dynamics that characterize Somalia, which divide the country and its population according membership six major clans—each composed of various subclans—creating a diffuse structure with power widely dispersed that did not fit the model of a democratic nation-state that was seeking to take root. Furthermore, the proposed system systematically marginalized the population of the north, given its differences with the south, stemming from their respective British and Italian colonial pasts.

In this context, in 1991, following the fall of the Siad Barre regime and the end of the civil war, leaders of the Isaaq clan—which is predominant in northwestern Somalia—declared Somaliland’s independence, while in the south, clans were fighting for control of Mogadishu.

Since then, Somaliland has functioned as a de facto state, consolidating effective territorial control (with the caveat that the SSC Khaatumo autonomous regional administration was established in the Sool, Saanag, and Cayn clan areas in 2023, and its subsequent annexation to Somalia as a federal state, currently under dispute), functional democratic institutions, economic autonomy, and the capacity to establish international relations; despite this, however, it lacks widespread international recognition.

The lack of international recognition in recent years stems from the fact that, generally speaking, the international system favors and protects the territorial integrity of all countries. This makes it extremely difficult for secessionist movements like this one to succeed. However, there are also political considerations that undermine the legal nature of recognition, giving greater weight to geopolitical factors than to legal ones in subject .

African Union, Arab League, and Ethiopia

In the case of Somalia, the country’s sovereignty, stability, and territorial integrity are at stake. Recognition of Somaliland could be seen as an incentive for various autonomous regions, such as Puntland andSouthwestern Somalia ( ), to reignite their secessionist ambitions. This would lead to further balkanization of the region, triggering long-term conflicts between separatist groups and their central governments, as well as clashes among different ethnic groups.

Along these lines, the African Union has been characterized by its efforts to preserve colonial borders in the face of separatist movements; in this case, due to the well-founded fear that a breakup of Somalia could create an opportunity for other secessionist movements to gain momentum in the Horn of Africa and across the rest of the continent.

The Arab League supports a united Somalia, among other reasons, so that it can serve as a counterweight to Ethiopia’s power in the region. The organization’s members believe that Somaliland’s independence in 1991 was the result of Ethiopian influence, within the framework conflicts with Egypt over the waters of the Nile River and religious divisions—factors that have shaped relations between Ethiopia and the members, particularly Egypt, to this day.

​Turning to Ethiopia, this country also does not consider it in its interests to recognize Hargeisa’s sovereignty, for various reasons. First, because formal recognition would entail significant risks in relation to the various separatist groups within Ethiopia, some of which are Somali groups. Second, despite its lack of recognition, Ethiopia is one of the countries with the most developed relations with Somaliland, particularly in the section and political section . International recognition and the potential formal ties with other actors that Somaliland could establish as a result would grant it greater bargaining power in economic matters with Ethiopia. In this way, Ethiopia benefits from having a poorer, unrecognized neighbor whose port remains open for its use.

This point is further reinforced when we consider thememorandum of understanding ( ) signed by both parties in January 2024, in which, according to Somaliland, Ethiopia would gain access to the sea in exchange for international recognition; Ethiopian sources later denied the contents of the memorandum.

Israel, Turkey, and the UAE

Three days after Israel recognized Somaliland, anmeeting committee UN committee was convened, during which Russia and China stated their positions, both condemning Israel’s diplomatic move. This stance of rejecting the recognition is understandable given Russia’s and China’s secessionist issues in Chechnya and Tibet, respectively.

The only member of committee that did not condemn Israel’s decision was the United States, in framework its strong alliance with Israel, although that stance has not led to U.S. recognition. For years, the United States has held an ambivalent position on this issue, characterizing it as an internal problem that must be resolved by Somalia, while simultaneously maintaining a stance in favor of a unified Somalia, particularly in order to combat Al-Shabab terrorism and piracy in the region. However, the unfolding of the war in the Middle East—particularly regarding the Houthi rebels’ involvement in the conflict—and a reevaluation of support for Israel could leadWashington todecide to formally recognize Somaliland.

Despite all these implications, Israel decided to proceed with the recognition of Somaliland, hoping that the strategic benefits would outweigh the diplomatic and political risks

Israel has framed its recognition in terms of regional security, strategic stability, and respect for Somaliland’s right to self-determination, but Israeli national security is the primary consideration. This relates to Somaliland’s geographical location, near the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which would give Israel a privileged position to monitor the Red Sea—an area that has been particularly turbulent in recent years due to the conflict between Israel and the Houthis in Yemen over the war in Gaza.

A permanent presence in Somaliland—or simply the strengthening of partnership the region—would provide Israel with strategic depth and greater flexibility in dealing with threats in the region, through the potential establishment of instructions , whether American or Israeli.

Beyond strategic considerations, Israel also seeks to consolidate its influence in the region to act as a counterweight to a potential adversary, Turkey. Relations between the two countries have deteriorated significantly due to Ankara’s critical stance toward Israel’s military incursions into Gaza.

At the same time, Turkey has been a core topic ally core topic Somalia since visit the country in 2011. Since then, Turkey has established its largest overseas military training base in Somalia, with the aim of fighting Al-Shabaab forces and maintaining Somalia’s unity. In exchange for this military support, Turkey receives economic and strategic benefits through various agreements.

Israel’s move would not be an isolated one: The United Arab Emirates (UAE), the only Arab League country that did not condemn the recognition, has been building informal ties with Somaliland in recent years to project its power in the region—a strategy it also pursues through its influence in conflicts such as those in Sudan and Yemen. Somalia’s recent breach of key agreements, the significant diplomatic move by Israel, and Emirati interests in Somaliland could lead the UAE to also recognize Somaliland’s sovereignty in order to grant it greater influence and autonomy.

National Interests and International Law

Beyond these issues, the status Somaliland serves as a prime example of how, when it comes to granting international recognition, political considerations take precedence, while legal issues take a back seat.

This distortion of the concept of international recognition is part of a widespread erosion of international law that has been occurring in recent years.

A clear illustration of this crisis is the contrast between the case of Somaliland and the Palestinian issue. Although, from a strictly legal standpoint, they are fundamentally different—a secession process versus a status military occupation—the way Israel handles both cases reveals a profound legal and diplomatic asymmetry.

, in order to block the recognition plenary session of the Executive Council Palestine plenary session of the Executive Council , rigidly invokes the standards of the 1933 Montevideo Convention regarding effective territorial control and defined borders—controls that the very dynamics of the occupation prevent the Palestinians from exercising. In contrast, in the case of Somaliland, the lack of internationally recognized borders or the inability to exercise control over the areas of SSC Khaatumo—which reject separation from Somalia—have not prevented Israel from recognizing its sovereignty.

In this regard, recognition and its legal status are subordinated to interests of a different nature, making it a tool for states to advance their geopolitical interests. As long as major powers continue to use recognition of statehood as a strategic privilege rather than a regulated right, international law will continue to lose its authority, reinforcing a dangerous scenario in which force and expediency carry more weight than the law itself.

The case of Somaliland demonstrates that the Horn of Africa is not merely a stage for local disputes; it is perhaps the status relevant status for understanding the current dynamics of the international system. There are too many interests at stake not to view with caution any future moves Israel or any other involved actor might make in the region. Furthermore, it exemplifies the impotence of international law to contain current geopolitical conflicts; more specifically, international recognition is no longer a validation of factual reality but rather another geopolitical tool.