In the picture
Manuel Herrera, at a roundtable by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), where he is researcher
On December 16, 2025, the National committee approved the“National Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),” which sets out, for the first time, Spain’s roadmap for addressing nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological (CBRN) threats. Officially published in the bulletin State bulletin (BOE) on February 16, 2026, this document positions Spain as the first country in its region to adopt a strategy specifically focused on addressing the risks associated with disarmament and the nonproliferation of WMDs in the context of current geopolitical instability. Consequently, it marks a milestone in Spain’s role in this area: not only is it the first National Strategy on CBRN threats, but Spain is also the only non-nuclear state in the Atlantic Alliance to have defined a specific national position on the matter.
At the Center for Global Affairs and Strategic Studies (GASS) at the University of School of Law , we wanted to address this issue, so we spoke with Manuel Herrera, researcher at BASIC (British American Security Information Council), an research center , nonprofit research center based in London. The think tank works with the goal protecting humanity, future generations, and the Earth’s ecosystem from nuclear risks and related security threats. And, with this lofty purpose his shoulders, Manuel leads BASIC’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Program, as well as the project on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Given his experience and background in the study of weapons of mass destruction in general, and nuclear weapons in particular, Manuel participated in the essay the “National Strategy Against the Proliferation of WMDs.” In this interview, he discusses the potential impact of this Strategy, as well as the current state of the international disarmament and nonproliferation regime.
Thank you very much for speaking with us and for shedding some light on the recent National Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. In this document, Spain refers to a “structural challenge to the system.” What do you think they mean by that?
Thank you all for counting on me.
It is important to note that the National Strategy is the result a collaborative effort involving discussions among various stakeholders and Departments the General State Administration, who conduct a evaluation and agreed-upon evaluation of the status. External advisors also participate, presenting proposals, reviews, updates, and data that can enrich the document.
In my view, the reference letter “structural questioning of the system” is the result these conversations, which reveal that the Kingdom of Spain’s perception of the problems with the current international nonproliferation and disarmament system is the document’s main focus. Issues related to arms control, on the other hand, are relegated to the background, and there is a logical reason for this. Spain does not have internship nuclear weapons internship to sit down and discuss, on an equal footing, for example, with the United States, issues related to the control of this subject weaponry. It is neither a possible nor a viable scenario. For all these reasons, the aforementioned “structural questioning of the system” reflects, rather, a consensus among the various public administrations that have drafted the National Strategy and that perceive the system as broken or in crisis.
That said, in my view, the “structural questioning of the system” is not entirely accurate. reference letter to the failure of the founding treaties of the nonproliferation and disarmament regimes—primarily the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)—does not seem entirely accurate to me, as I consider, for example, the CWC to be a success story in the field of nonproliferation and disarmament. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has been able to dismantle all of the world’s declared chemical weapons arsenals. The Syrian issue remains unresolved, though progress toward a resolution has been made since the cessation of hostilities and the rise to power of Ahmed al-Sharaa, following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Although challenges remain, chemical disarmament has taken place; an entire category of weapons of mass destruction has been effectively and verifiably eliminated. Therefore, to speak of a “structural challenge to the system” may, perhaps, be akin to shooting ourselves in the foot.
In your opinion, can the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty survive without real progress on disarmament?
Much of the problem stems from the complex status the NPT. The most recent review conferences, in 2015 and 2022, ended without a final consensus document, giving rise to geopolitical tensions and concern among both nuclear and non-nuclear states. At the same time, we have witnessed the emergence of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which to some extent conceptually rivals the NPT, or so it has been perceived by some NPT States Parties in their eagerness to enforce article , which specifically requires negotiating in good faith effective measures to curb degree program nuclear degree program , achieve nuclear disarmament, and conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament.
The Eleventh lecture the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was held from April 27 to May 22, 2026, at United Nations headquarters in New York, concluding without the adoption of a final declaration due to a lack of consensus. You, who were able to experience these meetings firsthand, what are your impressions of this latest NPT lecture ?
Honestly, my impressions are relatively positive, and I would say that the NPT is in better shape than I had perceived before these talks. It is common for there to be some squabbles over procedure issues during the initial discussions—on the first day of meetings—such as Iran’s vice-chairmanship or payments for the lecture itself, something that surprised me considerably. Beyond these issues, which I consider minor, during the time I participated in the lecture , I lecture witness any major conflicts between nuclear-weapon states; there were no cross-vetoes or attempts to derail the negotiations that had brought us together there. test good test this is that the lecturein this case, Vietnam—was able to present a first draft the final document after average a week, something that had never happened before. At first, it was a very simple document, nothing extraordinary or revolutionary. But it demonstrated a consensus on certain points, which I already considered a significant step forward.
However, at that time, the final document had yet to be finalized, and the goal these NPT Review Conferences is, in fact, precisely to try to reach a consensus—even if only a minimal one—something that was ultimately not achieved, since there was no consensus to adopt a joint final declaration.
Since Russia launched its offensive in Ukraine in February 2022, we have seen a resurgence of nuclear rhetoric that, in some ways, has reminded us of the debates that took place during the Cold War degree program . This rhetoric has continued with North Korea’s nuclear threats and Iran’s alleged nuclear program—which, in theory, prompted the Trump administration to launch a war on Iranian soil. How do you think the current status influences both discussions in international forums and the National Strategy itself?
I believe that tensions in the nuclear sphere are relatively constant. While in New York recently, discussing the matter with some delegations, they mentioned the need to consider the status and the security context of the international system as points of discussion during the negotiations and in essay final document. That said, these are very specific national positions; however, it is more common for the states participating in this subject conference to try precisely to prevent geopolitical issues from intruding on the talks so as not to affect, as much as possible, progress toward the proper implementation of the treaty—in this case, the NPT.
It is a rather complicated diplomatic balancing act because this treaty—and any other disarmament and nonproliferation treaty—does not exist in a political vacuum but is influenced by the dynamics of the international system. However, in my view, the States Parties engage in dialogue and consensus-building in pursuit of the common good. For example, the implementation of article of the NPT, which permits the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, was a central pillar of the talks and the subject of extensive discussion. Along the same lines, the States Parties debated their commitments to transparency and accountability within the framework NPT, as well as the proper implementation of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safeguards.
Do you think the international community, including Spain, has effectively accepted that North Korea is not going to denuclearize?
It is true that both North Korea and Iran were at the center of some discussions, with some countries portraying them as responsible for noncompliance with the NPT. That said, it is worth recalling that North Korea decided to withdraw unilaterally and voluntarily from the NPT, and that is a matter which, out of respect for the sovereignty of States, we cannot prevent.
What do you think Spain’s stance is on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, or on scientific developments in the biological and chemical fields? This topic was topic extensively debated at the seventh session of group work group work Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, which took place from December 8 to 12, 2025, at the United Nations headquarters in Geneva.
Spain has taken a firm stance consistent with the implementation of article of the NPT, and affirms that it will promote, to the best of its ability, the effective implementation of this article , which encourages the development nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, provided that the nonproliferation commitments set forth in the Treaty itself (Articles II and III) are fulfilled. Spain is not a major nuclear supplier; compared to other states, we do not manufacture reactors or reactor components on a large scale. Nevertheless, sample firm commitment and willingness to comply with the obligations of disarmament and non-proliferation treaties in general, and the NPT in particular.
The document discusses semiconductors and quantum computing. Why are these subject relevant to proliferation?
The products referred to in the National Strategy are important for nonproliferation because of their dual-use nature—that is, they have both peaceful and military applications. It is necessary to monitor and understand what the end use of these products will be and for what purpose they will be used. This applies to many other products—both tangible and intangible—in the fields of medicine, zootropic substances, and even water filters, desalination plants, or other subject technological equipment that could also be diverted to malicious purposes, in many cases related to the development weapons of mass destruction—whether nuclear, biological, or chemical.
In other words, there are numerous dual-use applications—beyond nuclear energy—in which Spain does participate and has economic, industrial, and commercial interests. This issue has been widely debated in the context of biological weapons, where the international treaty—the Biological Weapons Convention—lacks a verification mechanism. It is generally considered that this hinders the achievement of the Convention’s objectives and the guarantee of its effective implementation. However, this may also serve the economic interests of states with a significant biotechnology industry. There are many stakeholders involved in the industrial sectors that develop dual-use products, conduct research on dual-use products, or share sensitive information related to them.
So, is it possible to control dual-use technologies in a globalized world?
It is difficult, but not impossible. The evolution of international law in this regard is interesting. After developing legally binding treaties that impose obligations on States Parties, the international community tends to create multilateral forums, codes of best practices, and politically motivated norms of behavior that have been agreed upon to a certain extent.
Changing the subject a bit, I wanted to ask you—as is the case in any field of study today—about the influence of development , and especially artificial intelligence, in light of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. How does the National Strategy address this reality?
As you correctly predicted, technology and artificial intelligence were major topics of discussion. In fact, the development emerging technologies is discussion an almost recurring discussion in the context of the NPT and other international nonproliferation and disarmament treaties. During this latest lecture , some delegations highlighted the importance of artificial intelligence (AI), space technology, and quantum technologies, and noted that these technological advancements are here to stay—and will even gain momentum in the coming years. It will be necessary for diplomats, researchers, and the technology industry alike to address this from a proactive standpoint, focusing on the opportunities it offers as atool for security and training— such as so-called “nuclear forensics”—and not merely as source risk and concern. That said, these risks obviously exist, and we must work to reach a consensus among the States Parties to establish how these new technologies should be used—whether for public diplomacy or for developing biological, chemical, or nuclear arsenals.
Do you think existing export control systems are becoming obsolete?
I believe that intense and constant efforts are being made to achieve progress and adapt to changing circumstances. For example, the United States and China reached a agreement in 2024 not to incorporate AI into the nuclear command and control systems of these two countries. It is a agreement , but it allows us to continue moving forward.
Manuel, with this final, hopeful reflection, we’ll say goodbye—but not without thanking you once again for such a timely, interesting, and necessary conversation that helps us understand the current geopolitical context in the field of nonproliferation and disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, as well as Spain’s new National Strategy. We hope to have you back with us soon!
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* Mónica Chinchilla is a principal researcher at GASS in the area arms control and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction; she is a professor of International Public Law the University of Navarra