Energy as a Deterrent Against Morocco

On July 30, the Spanish city of Ceuta was the target of an operation in the gray zone organized by the Kingdom of Morocco, a country that does not recognize Spanish sovereignty over this city and often refers to it as an “occupied garrison.” As has happened in the past, Morocco exploited the frustration of its own citizens and, through disinformation, false promises, and an organized media campaign, turned them against the city. The result: at least 88 people dead, according to the latest figures, among the more than 50,000 who managed to cross the Spanish border and most of whom have since returned to Morocco.

Although the Spanish government has denied that Morocco was behind this migration event, there is a growing consensus among analysts that points to necessary coordination in subject regarding communication, logistics, and police tolerance. Given the nature of the Moroccan state— a hybrid regime controlled by the royal family through the economic, police, and military apparatuses—it is implausible to suggest that more than 50,000 people would spontaneously move toward the border with Ceuta without the knowledge and the acquiescence of the Makhzen.

–Through this operation, Morocco demonstrates its ability to exploit Spain’s reliance on subject for migration control. Operations in the gray zone—those not directly attributable to the aggressor and which do not in themselves constitute an act of war—tend to exploit precisely these vulnerabilities.

Morocco’s actions and growing boldness stand in contrast to a false perception, widespread in Spain, of a one-way strategic dependence on Morocco: immigration control, drug trafficking, and counterterrorism. These are easily deployable levers in the hands of the Moroccan state that confer upon it—despite its smaller size and limited capabilities—an aura of superiority in “gray zone” operations.

However, Morocco has an asymmetric dependence on Spain that is similar in nature to the one Rabat effectively exploits in its relationship with Madrid. Although generally unknown, Morocco has an asymmetric dependence on Spain in the energy sector that is easily exploitable.

This analysis will seek to examine this dependence, exploring how Spain could use it as a deterrent, and how energy—understood as a means of cooperation but also of deterrence ( tool )—should be integrated into relations with Morocco. The article concludes with a reflection on how Spain’s preference for peaceful coexistence with Morocco should not prevent it from preparing for a scenario of hybrid warfare involving the cities of Ceuta and Melilla.

Morocco's Growing Energy Dependence on Spain

Starting with electricity, energy cooperation between Spain and Morocco began in 1997 when construction of the first undersea power cable between the two countries was completed, withan initial capacity of 700 megawatts (MW),later expanded to 1,400 MW in 2006. The flow is overwhelmingly one-way: around 90% of the energy transmitted through these cables flows from Spain to Morocco, covering between 8% and 15% of Morocco’s electricity demand. These two power cables have contributed substantially to Morocco’s economic development , and security of supply during the first two decades of the century. Between 2007 and 2017, Spanish exports accounted for nearly 15% of Morocco’s electricity demand, reaching 5 TWh annually, thereby lowering the cost of electricity invoice and enabling Morocco to meet the rapid growth in domestic consumption and achieve the electrification of rural areas, where the rate of access to electricity rose from 37% in 1999 to 99.7% in 2020. This universal access to electricity has contributed to a significant improvement in the standard of living in Morocco’s most impoverished areas and is consideredone of the great successes of King Mohammed VI’s reign.

Despite the decline in trade following the entrance of the Safi and Jerada coal-fired power plants between 2017 and 2021, the closure of the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline (GME) in late 2021 and the drought in the Western Mediterranean between 2021 and 2022 restored the importance of Spanish exports to Morocco, which are now once again an indispensable element for the security of its electricity system. The closure of the GME— result d by Algeria’s decision not to renew the contract—placed significant strain on the Moroccan power grid, which traditionally obtained nearly 15% of its electricity from the natural gas-fired power plants in Tahaddart and Ain Béni Mathar.

But the cables provide something even more valuable than electrons: they synchronize the Moroccan network with the European power grid, maintaining its frequency and providing stability to a system that is increasingly integrating renewable energy sources. The main advantage of the synchronous work is that, in the event of a failure of a generator, consumer, or transmission line, the disruption can be compensated for within milliseconds, ensuring an uninterrupted supply. Synchronization has ensured the resilience of the Moroccan power system—one of the most stable in Africa and with the le average st supply interruptions,according to World Bank data . This synchronization has been a driver of industrial development around the Tangier Med Free Zone, one of Africa’s most dynamic industrial hubs as a center for automotive, aerospace, and electronics manufacturing. This interconnection also helped the Spanish power grid recover in record time following the blackout, although it is important to note the asymmetry here: the Spanish mainland grid has two powerful interconnections with Portugal and France, and two smaller ones with Morocco and the Balearic Islands. The Moroccan grid has a single high-capacity interconnection (relative to the size of its grid) with Spain and one with Algeria that has been inoperative since diplomatic relations were severed in 2021.

The electrical integration between Spain and Morocco stands in contrast to the electrical isolation of the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla. Morocco has historically refused to supply electricity to both cities, which must operate as energy islands with two small oil-fired power plants. In 2026, the power cable connecting the Iberian Peninsula to Ceuta is expected to become operational—a project ( project ) with a budget of 300 million euros that will help reduce the issue of power outages in the autonomous city and strengthen its supply security. Melilla, given its geographical distance from the Peninsula, is expected to remain isolated.

Let’s continue with the topic of gas. When Algeria shut down the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline (GME) in 2021, Morocco lost its sole supply source . Today, all the gas Morocco imports arrives as LNG purchased on the international market, regasified at Spanish plants, and shipped via the GME in reverse flow. Morocco has been announcing the construction of its first regasification terminal in the cities of Nador or Jorf Lasfar for a decade, but no investor seems convinced, and the latest public tender was canceled. Other projects, such as increasing domestic natural gas production—which currently covers about 5% of demand—have not met with the expected result , while the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline is a project of monumental proportions that lacks technical or financial viability.

The natural gas that Morocco imports from Spain powers combined-cycle plants that generate about 10% of the country’s electricity and provide the flexibility needed by its grid, which is dominated by coal (over 60%) and renewables (30%). Furthermore, due to climate change and persistent droughts in North Africa, Morocco has seen a structural decline in its hydroelectric generation. For Morocco, natural gas in electricity generation is the natural substitute for hydropower, as it is a generation source that can respond quickly and flexibly to fluctuations in demand or generation. Coal, the backbone of the Moroccan system, has much slower startup times and load ramps than the combined-cycle power plants at Tahaddart and Ain Béni Mathar. Since Morocco traditionally imported natural gas from Algeria—for which it paid royalties for transit through the GME pipeline and which was conceived as a constant, uninterrupted flow—Morocco lacks strategic natural gas storage facilities. To put this in context, Spain, which consumes about thirty times more natural gas than Morocco, has strategic reserves equivalent to nearly one month’s consumption.  

Therefore, between 15% and 20% of Morocco’s electricity consumption depends on Spain keeping the gas pipeline and the power interconnection open. These infrastructures are entirely dispensable for Spain’s security of supply, creating an asymmetric dependency that should be incorporated into Spain’s deterrence strategy against its neighbor’s irredentism.

In addition, there is a soft dependency subject on liquid fuels and LPG (commonly known as butane). Since the closure of Morocco’s only refinery in 2015, Spain has increased its exports of petroleum products, ensuring the African country’s fuel supply. In 2024, these sales accounted for nearly 12% of Spanish exports to Morocco, with a value of approximately 1.7 billion euros annually, consisting mainly of diesel, LPG, fuel oil, and gasoline. Since the fuel trade takes place entirely by sea, it would be easy for Morocco to find an alternative supplier of these products on the international market. fail Such exports would lack an asymmetric advantage, as they would harm Spain’s export position without compromising Morocco’s security of supply.

Energy as Part of Spain's Deterrence Strategy Against Morocco

Energy cooperation between Spain and Morocco has generated significant shared benefits that reinforce the argument for a common interest in subject cultural, migratory, humanitarian, counterterrorism, and commercial matters. The defining characteristic of bilateral energy cooperation is its asymmetric nature. For Spain, gas and electricity exports to Morocco represent a meager economic benefit, while for Morocco they are a fundamental part of its energy security. Furthermore, unlike Morocco’s other, more diffuse forms of asymmetric dependence on Spain—such as in trade— subject n energy, these dependencies are concentrated in two infrastructure projects: the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline and the undersea power cables. Both infrastructure projects are controlled and operated by semi-public companies, a rarity within Spain’s privatized energy business ecosystem. The undersea cables are jointly owned by Redeia (network Eléctrica Española) and the Moroccan ONEE. SEPI holds a 20% stake in Redeia, which is considered and operated as a strategic business . The Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline has a somewhat more complex ownership structure, but its Spanish section is operated by Enagás, whose main shareholder is SEPI and which, once again, operates as a strategic “ business .”

This is an asymmetric dependency concentrated in two pieces of infrastructure that are, moreover, controlled by the Spanish government. The basic principles of deterrence call for a real, credible, and well-communicated threat. This analysis has described the existence of a real threat; from this point forward, it proposes how Spain could project it credibly and the mechanisms for attempting to sustain it over time.

A Roadmap for Energy Deterrence

The first question that arises is how to leverage this asymmetric dependency and turn it into a deterrent against Moroccan irredentism. Both pieces of infrastructure—the gas pipeline and the power lines—offer two avenues for energy strangulation that would fit within hybrid or “gray zone” strategies.

The first approach is economic: to demand, in bilateral negotiations, a high price for the operation of both infrastructures, similar to how Russia has acted with its European neighbors. The mere threat of raising the cost of using the GME or the cables could be used as leverage against Morocco in other areas, such as cooperation on migration or law enforcement. This threat must always be limited to existing contracts, maintaining normal commercial relations while applying pressure at core topic key moments in negotiations or contract renewals.

The second approach is that of unavailability, which is also inspired by Russian behavior. Before the Nord Stream explosions in 2022, Gazprom had intermittently and unpredictably reduced its gas flows, citing maintenance issues with a turbine. It was an implausible excuse, but it was enough to curb supply and send gas prices soaring across Europe, with importing countries powerless to do anything about it.

In Spain, both the gas pipeline and the power lines have scheduled maintenance periods and experience periodic outages that require repairs. These outages could last longer than usual or coincide with times of particular need for Morocco, such as a drought or a heat wave. If both pieces of infrastructure were to fail simultaneously—even if the failure appeared to be coincidental—the pressure on Morocco’s security of supply would be considerable.

Similarly, a technical failure could cause a sudden outage of one of the power cables at a time when the Moroccan network is highly vulnerable: leave wind and solar power generation, a night during Ramadan with high demand, or a coal-fired power plant out of service for maintenance. The failure of that cable could cause a partial or total blackout in Morocco, and Spain could then demonstrate its willingness to cooperate by helping to restore network, in a gesture reminiscent of its response following the assault on Ceuta by 50,000 people.

How to Integrate Energy Deterrence into Foreign Policy Toward Morocco

The next question is how to integrate energy deterrence into foreign policy toward Morocco in order to make it sustainable over time. The first factor to consider is the law of diminishing marginal returns associated with the instrumentalization of interdependence. In other words, every time an actor in a dominant position carries out a hybrid action that exploits that position, the rational response of the affected actor is to take measures to prevent a recurrence—or at least to ensure it does not occur with the same intensity or asymmetry. For this reason, the “ employment ” ofthe “energy weapon”is often a path of no return that damages, for an indefinite period, mutual trust that is difficult to restore. This is the case with energy relations between Russia and Germany—which are now practically nonexistent—or with Japan’s dependence on China for rare earth elements following the 2010 incident, which has since been significantly mitigated. Therefore, and in the context framework of peaceful coexistence with Rabat, Spain must always demonstrate its genuine preference for energy integration as one of the key drivers of shared prosperity.

That said, within the context of this energy integration, there are certain preferences that Spain should seek to establish in its bilateral relationship.

The first is to maintain Spain’s dominant position over Morocco in the subject of electricity interconnections. This involves securing a monopoly on electricity interconnections between Europe and Morocco, ensuring that Morocco’s third cable to the Iberian Peninsula connects with Spain rather than Portugal, and preventing the—already limited—feasibility of any undersea cable to Italy or France. The most effective way to achieve this is to accelerate the construction of the third cable with Spain and divert Morocco’s available resources for new infrastructure toward this connection. The second approach would be to challenge the construction of any other cable as it passes through Spanish territorial waters, preferably citing environmental “ subject ” concerns. Spain has the geographical advantage here, since Spain-Morocco cables will always be much less expensive than those laid with any other neighbor, which would have to pass through Spanish territorial waters or the exclusive economic zone.

Given the natural gas “ subject ,” it is essential to delay the construction of any new import infrastructure that would allow Morocco to diversify its supply. To this end, Spain has a clear leverage point: offering GME gas at a competitive price on a long-term basis, ensuring that Morocco’s dependence on Spanish gas continues over time and intensifies with increased volumes. The GME has an annual capacity of 12 bcm at exchange , compared to Moroccan demand of between 1 and 2 bcm of gas, which leaves ample room to increase Spain’s gas exports to Morocco and, thereby, Morocco’s dependence. The second lever would consist of ensuring that Spanish companies do not participate in the construction of the LNG terminal in Morocco and, specifically, that Spanish banks and multilateral financial institutions where Spain has influence (the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and development -EBRD-, the Neighborhood Investment Platform (NIP), or the Global Gateway) refrain from financing it, citing the existence of an “ available ” infrastructure—the GME—and the negative environmental impact of investing in fossil fuels. Alternatively, Spain could offer rhetorical support for the West African Gas Pipeline—also known as the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline—since the chances of it materializing are minimal and it would serve to create uncertainty regarding the viability of private investment in an LNG plant.

In addition, Spain must press Morocco to raise its climate ambition and make a firm commitment to closing its coal-fired power plants. At COP31 in Brazil in 2025, Morocco pledged to end the use of coal by 2040 if it received the necessary international financing. This marks the first time the country has set a date for the phase-out of this fossil fuel in a Nationally Determined Contribution, and Spain should insist that European funding and financial aid for energy subject be contingent on the closure of some of its coal-fired power plants. Coal provides Morocco with a stable and competitively priced energy source : although the country imports 100% of the coal it consumes, it is a subject raw material that arrives easily by ship, is unloaded without complications at a port terminal, and has a well-diversified market, with the United States as the top provider. Spain must highlight Morocco’s inconsistency in presenting itself as a green and renewable energy powerhouse while keeping its polluting coal-fired power plants operational. Furthermore, it must press Brussels to strictly enforce the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) on Moroccan electricity exports. Thus, if Morocco aspires to become an exporter of “green electricity” to Europe in the future—an ambition repeatedly stated by Rabat despite its lack of realism in the short term—it will have to shut down its coal-fired power plants and commit to renewables and natural gas as a backup.

Finally, it is necessary to publicly highlight Israel’s growing importance as an investor in Morocco’s energy sector. Israel’s presence, within the framework of the Abraham Accords, ranges from hydrocarbon exploration to desalination, including investment in renewable energy. Many of these activities take place in Western Sahara and are part of Rabat’s rapprochement with Tel Aviv since 2021. Spain would do well to address the flow of information on social media regarding this issue, making the Moroccan public aware that their government is allowing Israeli capital to “ entrance ” into its energy sector, while the citizens of Gaza lack the most basic services such as water, electricity, or fuel. Undermining the legitimacy of the Israel-Morocco axis among the Moroccan public—which has historically been sympathetic to the Palestinian cause—would help maintain the asymmetry in Spain’s bilateral energy relationship with Morocco.

In the days following the migration incident in Ceuta, social media became a battleground for disinformation and the defense of the Moroccan narrative. Spain, as a democracy, should not play into the disinformation game, but it can articulate a truthful narrative based on objective facts through social media platforms such as X, TikTok, Facebook , or Instagram, leveraging the diversity of its Autonomous Cities to spread this message more effectively across different languages and channels.

Some Conclusions and the Road Ahead

Spain enjoys a dominant position in its energy relationship with Morocco. This bilateral relationship has been built on the principles of Euro-Mediterranean integration, shared prosperity, and a “buffer of interests.” It would be absurd to deny Spain’s influence as a soft power, which it has achieved thanks to a genuinely constructive foreign policy rooted in the ideals of liberal peace.

However, it is necessary to promote a strategic “ discussion ” that allows this asymmetric energy dependence to be used as a “ tool ” for deterrence and, if necessary, as a genuine lever that can be activated in the gray zone and in the context of hybrid warfare.

The events at the Ceuta border are not a spontaneous “ result ” of migration flows from Morocco to Europe, but rather part of a strategy to pressure Spain, following the precedents set by the 1975 Green March and, more recently, the 2021 Ceuta migration incident.

Spain must take grade and prepare to confront Moroccan irredentism regarding Ceuta, Melilla, and the Spanish sovereign territories in North Africa with more tools than a policy of appeasement, which has proven to be very limited in its short-term effectiveness and disastrous in the long term.

We must speak more about the Moroccan threat, emphasizing that cooperation, integration, and shared prosperity are the preferred path for Spain, while at the same time setting clear limits on Morocco’s claims to territories under Spanish sovereignty. In this context, energy presents a real opportunity to underscore Spain’s preference for cooperation, but also its capabilities when it comes to confrontation.

In any case, the first step in any deterrence strategy is being able to identify the threat. This is a task that remains unaddressed by the current Spanish government, as well as by the main parties in the civil service examination. However, and although likely stemming from the government’s silence on the matter, the absence of a serious “ discussion ” regarding Moroccan irredentism also permeates the mainstream media and think tanks in Spain—a resounding defeat for Spanish civil society that, in the final written request, undermines the interests of the very society it claims to defend, represent, and protect.

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