Alone in the World Against Russia, China, and the U.S.

Arancha González Laya, former Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, former Director of the UN International Trade Center, and current Dean of the Paris School of International Affairs at Sciences Po, breaks down the global landscape currently facing the European Union. Throughout the book, she offers a sharp analysis of the geoeconomic reality, enriching her insights with anecdotes she has witnessed throughout her degree program. González Laya calls on us to “define who we are when allies no longer behave like allies and when power once again speaks louder than right.”

In this article essay, the author argues for the need to achieve what she calls “the European squaring of the circle”—that is, not to waver in the face of Russia, to reduce strategic dependence on the United States, and not to fall into China’s arms. Regarding Russia, the author begins with the large-scale invasion of Ukraine and the “Zeitenwende” (turning point), through which she emphasizes the EU’s need to rearm as a deterrent. In this regard, she advocates for a European defense industrial policy with the goal to address its Achilles’ heel: industrial and strategic fragmentation. The European defense market remains organized on a national scale, with few joint procurements and too much duplication.

As for the other side of the Atlantic, Europe must learn to live without its big brother and come of age in a dangerous world. In terms of defense, European states have delegated a significant portion of their protection to the U.S., and such a fundamental aspect of sovereignty cannot depend on who happens to be in the White House. Now Washington is pushing for an increase in European military “ expense ,” knowing that much of that money will ultimately end up bolstering its own industry. On the trade front, González Laya argues that Trump and his “America First” policy do not want strong, sovereign states, but rather vassals.

As for the Asian giant, a strong EU is a necessary “ tool ” for China to prevent a bipolar global scenario. However, the ideal scenario for China would be a Union less aligned with Washington but still maintaining access to the common market, so that Beijing could offload its production surpluses—which largely underpin its model of growth—without accepting changes to its model or putting pressure on Russia to end the war in Ukraine. China and the EU are bound to find common ground, but on the framework of a balanced, equal-footing relationship that does not exist as long as trade imbalances, China’s subsidized overproduction, and barriers to access to its market persist.

Finally, in * core topic * interna, she argues that the greatest threat to Europe lies not in China or Russia, but in the internal erosion of its democratic norms. “A democracy without algorithmic sovereignty is an imperfect democracy,” González Laya asserts. In commercial terms, Europe cannot become a commercial power without also being one in geopolitical terms, without the capacity to defend itself, and without integrating its capital markets. In her view, the Union needs to integrate the diverse perspectives of its members. This diversity of perspectives, according to the author, is a strength if integrated, but a weakness if ignored.