Military diplomacy in Latin America: A critical turning point

The US National Security Strategy published in November prioritizes Latin America for the first time in decades. To support the revitalization of the Monroe Doctrine, the Trump administration warns of the growing activity of rival powers (China and Russia) in the US hemisphere. One of the areas where Beijing and Moscow have strengthened their cooperation with the region since the beginning of the century is military diplomacy, which has thus become a strategic battleground.

China's advantage over the United States in certain aspects of military diplomacy toward Latin America was highlighted in September by one of Washington's leading think tanks, the Center for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS). New data by the institution indicated that China has surpassed the American hegemon in its own region in areas where the US had long remained the partner . China now enrolls five times more Latin American military students in its training programs training the United States; for its part, Russia has been promoting an 'axis of autocracies' by sending military advisers to Nicaragua and Venezuela, where it also trains security forces. Activities such as educational exchanges, defense alliances, training, and joint exercises seek to gain influence among both current and future generations of military elites.

The 'Trump Corollary' (the update the Monroe Doctrine, also referred to as the 'Donroe Doctrine'), implemented with the naval deployment in the Caribbean, aims to "deny" competing powers "the ability to establish forces or other threatening capabilities, or to possess or control vital assets in our hemisphere," according to the new National Security Strategy. Although this warning falls within the realm of 'hard power', the military diplomacy developed by China and Russia has much to do with it in that it affects armies and their members, even if conceptually it is a matter of 'soft power'.

Beijing does not appear acknowledgement have acknowledgement US warning, and in December responded to Trump's document with one of its own devoted exclusively to Latin America. This officialpaperexpressly promotes exchanges and military cooperation between China and the United States' neighbors in the hemisphere.

Under the heading "Peace Program," it says:

China will actively pursue military exchanges and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries, expand friendly exchanges between senior defense officials and military personnel from both sides, strengthen political dialogue, and establish work meeting mechanisms. Both sides will conduct mutual visits between delegations and ships, deepen professional exchanges in areas such as military training, staff training staff UN peacekeeping operations, expand internship cooperation internship non-traditional security areas such as financial aid and counterterrorism, and strengthen cooperation in military trade and technology. China will continue to organize the China-Latin America and Caribbean Defense Forum, with voluntary participation. China welcomes the participation of Latin American and Caribbean countries in the Xiangshan Forum in Beijing.

The programs of study define it as a "peaceful, non-confrontational relationship between the armed forces and related infrastructure as an instrument of foreign and security policy." Unlike conventional military intervention with troops, instructions weapons, it has seven main mechanisms: educational exchanges ( training programs, military academies), high-level dialogues (ministerial meetings, defense forums), joint exercises (multinational training operations), development programs (attendance , professionalization initiatives), cooperation in the defense industry (arms sales, technology transfer), humanitarian operations in cases of disaster, and cultural and symbolic participation (military parades, commemorations, talks).

This approach the door to soft power, understood as the skill attracting and cooperating rather than coercing. Ten years ago, Xi Jinping highlighted China's interest in military exchanges, explicitly defining the purpose military diplomacy as contributing to the protection of sovereignty and security and the development national interests. This is a internship been carried out by all the major powers, and most notably by the United States over the last century in its relations with Latin America. Only a lesser concern for its own hemisphere, following the end of the Cold War and the global reach of the US in the 'unipolar moment', has led to a relaxation of this policy in recent decades, which has at the same time created space for penetration in the region, especially for China. In any case, the US, China, and Russia have been pursuing different strategies.

USA: The Southern Command takes center stage

The United States operates mainly through the institutional framework of the Southern Command. In addition, it relies on other institutions guided by the main mechanisms of military diplomacy, such as high school, an entity created in 1962 within the framework the Organization of American States (OAS) and through its board Defense board , which has graduated 3,169 students from 29 countries since its inception, 27% of whom have attained the rank of general or admiral. The United States also has the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, launched in 1946 in the Panama Canal Zone, where it was known as the 'School of the Americas' and where 60,000 military and police personnel from 23 countries were trained. During the Cold War, this school trained many of the commanders who later led the Latin American military dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s; since 1984, the center has been located in Georgia.

For its part, the Southern Command organizes frequent bilateral contacts with the leaders of the region's armies. This has been the main task of Southcom chiefs, as sample diary by recent leaders such as General Laura Richardson, who attempted to diversify the presence in areas unrelated to security, order, and justice. There has been criticism that, with the White House and department interest focused on more distant places, the United States' reduced diplomacy toward Latin America is limited to the contacts developed by the Southern Command. At times, the voyages of the US Comfort, the US Navy hospital ship, have been seen as the main humanitarian activity of the United States in the hemisphere.

The diplomatic work of the Southern Command is detailed in the latest report presented to congress in February 2025 by Admiral Alvin Holsey. Holsey was responsible for leading the change in profile United States' profile in the region—shifting from a diplomatic to a military one—as he oversaw the naval deployment in the Caribbean, although he requested his replacement in advance, which took place before the attack on Venezuela.

China: Incentives for middle-ranking officers and non-commissioned officers

Faced with these ties, which have been partially weakened by routine, China has accelerated its own military contacts with the region. According to CSIS calculations, between 2022 and 2025, China carried out 97 military exchanges with 18 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and has increased the issue Latin American military personnel studying at its centers fivefold compared to those studying in the United States. Focusing on mid-level officers and non-commissioned officers (unlike the United States, which focuses on senior commanders), Beijing generates incentives that include class travel and accommodation five-star hotels, while offering courses in Spanish and guaranteeing streamlined approval processes without political or legal consequences. Multilateral frameworks such as the China-LAC Defense Forum (24 participating countries in 2022) and bilateral frameworks such as the China-Brazil Joint exchange Cooperation Commission institutionalize these relationships.

Since the beginning of the century, China's presence has become increasingly assertive and accepted by various Latin American countries. Washington has questioned China's real intentions, suggesting that what Beijing seeks by strengthening its ties with the region is access to abundant natural resources, such as lithium, as well as gaining influence to destabilize the international power system, as has been outlined in the Southern Command's annual reports to congress, such as the one cited above.

Russia: Cold War Allies

Russia applies its strategy in a more ostentatious and direct manner by focusing on its Cold War allies—Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba—remaining faithful to its Primakov Doctrine, which seeks to penetrate the United States' "backyard," just as the United States does in Russia's "near abroad." Moscow is firm in its projection of force (for example, in June 2024 it deployed a submarine in Cuba that passed less than 50 kilometers from Florida), which it carries out simultaneously with the use of asymmetric tools, such as the dissemination of specific content from RT and Sputnik Mundo and cyber penetration through fake news and trolls. These are channels for the dissemination of messages imbued with pro-Russian narratives, in an operation that is "much broader, deeper, and more successful than is commonly believed," according to the Southern Command in its report .

Russia had extensive relations with the region in terms of arms sales—also a form of military diplomacy—during the period of prosperity resulting from the commodity price boom (2003–2013). However, once this boom ended, Russia's activities in the Western Hemisphere focused on its close ties with Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Russia has only gone beyond this triangle in another area that can also be considered military diplomacy: the installation of antennas for Glonass, its satellite geolocation system, managed by the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Between 2022 and 2025, Russian military academies have regularly accepted students from their main Latin American allies, such as the Tyumen Military Engineering technical school and the Mikhailovskaya Military Artillery Academy, according to CSIS. However, weakened in its foreign policy by the war in Ukraine, Russia has now also been shaken by the control that Washington has begun to exert over Venezuela and which it may want to extend to Nicaragua and Cuba.

Time for realignments

Latin American countries have tried to benefit from these military diplomacy alliances, some aligning themselves more closely with the ideology of the power with which they cooperate, and others limiting the relationship to avoid compromising their foreign policy or, where applicable, to avoid risking damaging their relationship with the United States if they collaborate excessively with China or Russia. There are regional variations that are test multiple and pragmatic alignment. Brazil, for example, is a founding member of the BRICS, participates in the Belt and Road Initiative, and cooperates with China in a wide range of areas, but at the same time is an important ally of the US outside NATO. Argentina, despite Milei's anti-China rhetoric, is open to investment from Beijing; Colombia maintains operational cooperation with the United States despite recent tensions between Trump and Petro and the latter's openness to Chinese investment...

This multiple alignment also converges in Latin American institutional fragmentation. One of the most prominent examples is CELAC, whose 33 members, supported by China, promote the rhetoric of a multipolar world. Another example is the collapse of committee Defense committee , an organ of the defunct Unasur, which left no effective security mechanism other than subregional groupings that remain ideologically divided.

The United States, China, and Russia will maintain their presence through soft power, largely avoiding direct confrontation. This will ensure that Latin America continues to be a strategic territory for cooperation, educational exchanges, and attendance . However, US alarm over Chinese influence in the region and the consequent new application of the Monroe Doctrine herald a time of realignment, in which Washington will demand greater loyalty, especially in its most immediate area —the Greater Caribbean—while China may maintain influence in areas of the hemisphere further away from the US.

As noted in the programs of study considered, the direction of Latin American military diplomacy will depend on the region's ability to transform this skill into a tool its own institutional strengthening and sovereignty. The United States should modernize its approach reducing its systematic and bureaucratic rigidity in order to expand its civil and political relations and further institutionalize its role by prioritizing security and historical-cultural ties. China should refine its legitimacy and implement transparency and respect for regional sovereignty. Russia will likely continue with a disruptive attitude, highly focused on saving what it can of its "axis of autocracies." Military diplomacy, properly understood, builds capacity rather than dependence, strengthens institutions rather than personalizing relationships, and creates resilience rather than vulnerabilities; it is transforming Latin America from an object of skill a subject of strategy.