In the picture
Cover of Carlos Malamud's book Golpe militar y dictadura en Argentina (1976-1983). Sur, paredón y después... (Military Coup and Dictatorship in Argentina (1976-1983). South, firing squad, and then...) (Madrid: Catarata, 2026), 262 p.
March 24 marks the 50th anniversary of the military coup in Argentina that led to the military dictatorship that ruled the country between 1976 and 1983. Carlos Malamud, Full Professor American History at UNED and researcher Elcano, has compiled a Issue an account of the events and some reflections on them.
Born in Buenos Aires and in his twenties at the beginning of the 1970s, Malamud is well acquainted with the process that led to Juan Domingo Perón's return in 1973 and the rapid collapse of the restored democracy after his death in 1974 and his replacement by Vice President María Estela Martínez de Perón (Isabelita): political violence, with attacks by the Montoneros and the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) and the repression of subversion, and the economic crisis resulting from the exhaustion model import substitution industrialization (ISI) model widespread in Latin America.
This connection staff taint the pages of this work with subjectivity; on the contrary, staff guarantees knowledge and an interest in a topic which bibliography author has been able to keep up to date with bibliography . In his book, Malamud follows the facts established by historiography in recent decades, taking from these publications what he considers most relevant.
The work follows a chronological order, although in order to provide greater context to the events and decisions—especially those of the military command—there are occasional flashbacks and flash-forwards that do not hinder the reader's understanding of the events. For non-Argentine readers, the complexity lies in understanding the nuances of each variant of the political spectrum in Argentina at that time. If Peronism still has many faces today, with elements that remain largely difficult to understand from the outside, everything becomes even more complicated when we add the differences between the guerrilla groups, the unions, and the military cliques (disagreements between the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and between the commanders of those same branches); there are even variations between the initial attitudes held by the major newspapers and the Catholic hierarchy and those they held later in the dictatorship.
The economic issue is another complicating factor. The dictatorship chose Martínez de Hoz—Minister of Economics most of the period—to correct the statism of the ISI doctrine, which was fueling inflation, deficit, and debt. But this was a contradiction: nationalism, interventionism, and controls of all subject prevailed among the military leadership, so that liberal measures were only half-heartedly implemented and did not have the desired effect, accentuating the inflationary dynamic.
It can be said that Malamud successfully passes the test presenting all this complexity in an orderly and understandable way.
There is no purpose with regard to the international version of that traumatic experience of the Argentine people (which the author describes as "the most ominous and bloody military dictatorship in Argentine history"), nor any desire to rescue any figure. Videla appears perhaps more accurately portrayed than the stereotype of the bloodthirsty dictator—less hot-headed than other military leaders, opposed to the war with Chile over the Beagle Channel—although this does not diminish his responsibility for the crimes committed, as confirmed by his subsequent life sentence. For their part, Massera—and ultimately Galtieri—are confirmed in their roles as particularly negative actors (the former more perverse than the latter). On the other hand, Malamud criticizes the sectors of the Mothers of place Mayo who glorified the guerrilla violence carried out by their 'disappeared' children (one injustice should not justify another) and the Peronist voices, such as Kirchnerism, that have kept that same narrative alive.
The author also points out that Operation Condor originated and management the capitals of the Southern Cone (it was not orchestrated by Washington, although this practice was in line with US interests); he notes that Argentina and Chile were on the brink of war in December 1978; He is merciless in his criticism of the headlong rush into the Falklands War and its poor planning and execution, and presents a profile favorable profile of Alfonsín, who was aware of the military's loss of prestige in that conflict and accelerated the return to democracy.
Malamud devotes the last few pages to various clarifications and considerations regarding the dictatorship and the report reserved report it. On the one hand, he wants to make it clear that the state terrorism carried out by the military in power took place when the guerrillas had already been largely defeated: the purpose the repression was not so much to avoid security risks as it was the totalitarian interest in shaping a new society in agreement a specific framework . On the other hand, Malamud demands the right to question the figure of 30,000 disappeared, not because he believes it to be high or leave, but because, due to the difficulties that existed and continue to exist in quantifying them properly, a symbolic figure was adopted that has been used politically but requires historical verification.
In the heat of discussion the "two demons," the author argues against validating the claim that those who took up arms are justified and glorified for opposing the perversion of a state dominated by capitalist interests. He also denies that what happened then, although certainly horrific, was genocide, as some voices label it.
Malamud regrets that Argentina, the Southern Cone country that was quickest to prosecute members of the military juntas, has instead become the place where part of the left continues to defend the validity of the armed guerrilla struggle of that period —unlike the mistakes acknowledged by former revolutionary leaders who later became prominent leaders in Brazil and Uruguay— and where issues surrounding the dictatorship continue to be more emotionally charged.
This effort to rigorously define the terms of Argentina's experience between the 1970s and 1980s is an invaluable contribution to the discussion the fiftieth anniversary of the military coup.