Reasons for European Identity

There is often a serious problem with essays on Europe written by pro-Europe advocates: the pages are filled with wishful thinking about what the European Union should be. It is not that they fail to diagnose many problems, but their initial idealism prevents them from addressing them with sufficient realism. This is not the case with the work of Juan González-Barba, who has extensive diplomatic experience (he has served as ambassador to Turkey and Croatia, and has also been posted to Greece and Brussels, among other missions) as well as experience in management (among other positions, he has served as Secretary of State for the European Union).

González-Barba brings together two internship dimensions in his internship : on the one hand, a geopolitical perspective— result a deep interest in history and its manifestation in geography—which does not lead him to pessimism in the face of the harsh reality of individual national interests; on the other hand, a deeply rooted and steadfast pro-European patriotism, which does not lead him to naive voluntarism.

Much of the book is, in fact, a geopolitical reflection, drawing heavily on the former (a distillation of his extensive reading and knowledge gained from his many diplomatic postings) and incorporating measured doses of the latter (the author does not claim to be exhaustive; rather, he seeks to offer some insights of his own). Geography does not determine history, he cautions, “but it exerts an influence that we must learn to interpret.”

What González-Barba discerns in the map of Europe and in the shared history of its nations are three general laws, which serve as the framework for the book’s chapters. First is what he calls the iron law: “As an integral part of Eurasia, Eastern Europe is subject to Asian influences, Western Europe is the last bastion resisting them, and Central Europe is the crucible that shapes the European character of each era.” This law is complemented by the silver law: “In Europe, the balance of power reigns,” both within countries and between them. And above both stands the golden law: “Europe is a project , despite its frequent setbacks, has the individual as its central axis.”

Among the interesting ideas in this work is the characterization of Great Britain, France, and Italy as the “enigma,” the “yeast” and the “fertilizer,” respectively, of Europe, or the discussion of Hungary’s crucial role in European destinies, given that it occupies a large part of the Pannonian Plain where some of the invasions from Asia landed and took root: a Magyar influence that has been particularly evident in recent years. The book also addresses Turkey’s and Israel’s relationship with the EU, whose nationalisms González-Barba presents as having unmistakably European roots (the Turks historically sought rapprochement; the Jews, separation).

In the case of Spain, González-Barba notes that its nation-building process could not be completed to the same extent as that of other European nations of equal historical significance, such as England or France: on the one hand, because the process was much more far-reaching, since for several centuries Spanish identity included Spanish America; on the other hand, because internal differences were not counteracted by the centrifugal effect of participation in the world wars, but rather by the centripetal dynamics of several civil wars, for which Spain holds the European record in the 19th and 20th centuries.

This is something that Spaniards in general should learn to accept, but it is especially true for Catalan and Basque nationalists, who operate in equally diverse regions and whose projects are similarly doomed to remain unfulfilled, as the author warns.

When it comes to principles, González-Barba defends what is considered politically incorrect in many circles: Europe’s Christian roots. It is not that he intends to draw conclusions in a particular direction, but rather that he acknowledges an origin that accounts for a distinct identity in terms of values (this does not prevent him from supporting entrance to the EU, precisely because he is not speaking in terms of religion).

When it comes to recommendations, González-Barba is keenly aware of the need for pragmatism. While the purpose is ambitious—“to help convince the majority of European citizens that defending the European Union is a matter of personal concern and that the stakes are high”—the next steps in European integration must be realistic. He proposes three areas of focus.

The first is to strengthen the EU’s hard power, but not only in defense: revising current skill policies skill fostering the creation of European industrial champions; establishing procedures to ensure sufficient access to rare earths; creating a European intelligence service; and guaranteeing sufficient funding for the new functions the EU wishes to assume, such as the issuance of Eurobonds. Second, expand free trade agreements and implement recommendations from the Draghi and Letta reports (for example, allowing European companies to operate throughout the EU under a single rule). Finally, foster a pan-European sense of belonging, without which the EU would risk disappearing.

The only problem is that this core topic patriotism, the perception core topic Europe as a homeland—lies in the realm of emotions, and emotions operate according to principles that are beyond the reach of reason and even self-interest.