Carlyle was right when he argued that Bolivar, the Liberator, was a kind of "Washington of Colombia", a leader whose unionist will overcame the disintegrating character of his opponents. Bolivar's Pan-American vision collided with the growing sovereign exaltation of the new republics, interested in strengthening instrumental nationalism. The Monroe Doctrine emerged as a barrier against the possible excesses of foreign powers: "America for the Americans".

In this framework of idyllic fraternity, thirty years ago, the Malvinas war broke out, provoked by the opportunism of the dictator Galtieri, a secondary leader who did not hesitate to tear the Pandora's box of nationalism, infringing all the laws of military strategy. Let us not fool ourselves. Nationalism will be invoked until the problem is solved final. That is the reason why Peronism (incorrigible according to the "timid irresponsible" Borges) has profusely used the Malvinas card. If there is one thing Cristina Fernandez has shown, it is that her government aspires to mimic the situation, in the traditional framework of Latin populism.

Faced with such political volatility, the United Kingdom has opted for military armor (it is difficult to surprise "perfidious Albion" twice). Argentina, for its part, only has the diplomatic route as an option and for this it counts on the sympathy of the continent. However, the excessive politicization of the topic carried out by Kirchnerism could happen invoice. If at the level of International Office support is constant and solid (MERCOSUR, ALBA, CAN, CELAC, Brazil and Chile at degree scroll state), in the face of a real conflict, Argentina does not have secure allies. The betrayal of the Peronist government of Carlos Menem to Peru during the Cenepa war has caused the only country that sent arms to Buenos Aires in 1982 (10 Mirage M5, Exocets, etc.) to stick strictly to diplomatic language. Moreover, in a war scenario, it is unlikely that Brazil would move a destroyer to save its partner in MERCOSUR or that Chile would sacrifice an aircraft for its Andean neighbors.

In the Latin American case, instrumentalizing the external front to influence domestic policy is a double-edged sword. After the nationalist apotheosis came the end of Galtieri. President Kirchner would do well to analyze the historical lessons of her people. Sometimes, bread for today is hunger for tomorrow.